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or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums 
and How to Fix Them 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER 
The subprime mortgage crisis was not only an economic disaster but 
posed challenges to traditional rules of property law.  Banks helped create 
the crisis by marketing mortgages through unfair and deceptive practices.  
They induced many consumers to take out high-priced loans they could not 
afford and then passed the risk to investors who were fooled into thinking 
these were safe investments.  These practices violate traditional norms 
underlying both consumer protection and securities regulation statutes.  In 
addition, U.S. banks greased the wheels of the mortgage securitization 
process by creating a privatized mortgage registration system that has 
undermined the clarity and publicity of property titles.  Because of 
securitization procedures and the lax record-keeping practices, the banks 
have undermined the property recording system; we no longer have clear 
public titles to real property in the United States.  To fix the mess they left 
us, we must adopt norms to govern the mortgage market that will protect 
both homeowners and investors from predatory loans while promoting 
legitimate property transactions.  We also need to fix the mortgage 
registration system so we have a legal infrastructure for property that both 
works well and reflects the norms of a free and democratic society. 
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or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums  
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* 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER
∗∗ 
לכשמ.–ןתת אל רוע ינפלו 
Do not put a stumbling block before the blind.
1 
—Leviticus (Vayikra) 19:14 
 
For prevention of many fraudulent Practices . . . All Leases 
Estates Interests of Freehold or Termes of yeares or any 
uncertaine Interest of in to or out of any Messuages 
Mannours Lands Tenements or Hereditaments made . . . by 
Parole and not putt in Writeing . . . shall have the force and 
effect of Leases or Estates at Will onely and shall not either 
in Law or Equity be deemed or taken to have any other or 
greater force or effect . . . .
2 
—An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 
England, 1677 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The subprime crisis shattered  both the world economy and our 
illusions.  In that innocent time before the crisis, New Deal government 
policy made mortgages widely available and relatively affordable while, 
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2 An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.).  
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over time, both state property laws and common practice imposed 
minimum standards on transactions that protected homeowners from 
onerous, discriminatory, unfair, or deceptive mortgage terms.
3  Those who 
could not afford to buy housing either rented or relied on alternative 
government programs to obtain it.  To be sure, we had poverty, 
homelessness, discrimination, and injustice, and the quality of housing for 
low-income families left much to be desired.  Things were far from perfect.  
But state recording statutes and real estate practices worked tolerably well, 
both clarifying property titles and making that information publicly 
available.
4  Beginning around 1980, however, a new era of banking 
deregulation unleashed vast changes in the ways mortgages were sold, 
marketed, and recorded.
5  After 1990, these developments eventually led to 
the widespread sale and securitization of subprime mortgages.
6  Cheered 
on by President George W. Bush’s call for an “Ownership Society,”
7 these 
mortgages helped fuel a housing bubble that burst in 2007, plunging us 
into the worst recession since the Great Depression.
8  Now in 2013, we 
find ourselves still living with the effects of the subprime crisis and 
cleaning up the mess it left us in.
9 
                                                                                                                          
3 See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Homeownership—Dream or Disaster?, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
17, 25–26 (2012) (outlining how the federal government “made home loans affordable for millions of 
Americans” by requiring “participating lenders [to] offer fully amortizing loans with level monthly 
payments, fixed interest rates, and low down payments”). 
4 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES § 12.3.3.1, at 
876–77 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the recording system and its interplay with real estate transactions 
generally). 
5 K ATHLEEN  C.  ENGEL  &  PATRICIA  A.  MCCOY,  THE  SUBPRIME  VIRUS:  RECKLESS  CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 16 (2011).  
6  See  ANDREW  DAVIDSON,  ANTHONY  SANDERS,  LAN-LING  WOLFF,  &  ANNE  CHING, 
SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 287–88, fig.15.1 (2003) (recognizing that 
securitization and “the overall size of the private-label market has more than doubled since 1994”); 
Yuliya Guseva, Evolutionary Developments in Mortgage Securitization: Financial Law Reforms, 
Putative Beneficiaries, and Archetypal Economic Risks, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 395, 
435–36, 464 (2012) (“Throughout the 1990s and the first few years of this century, the volume of 
public and private securitization transactions alike increased . . . .”).  
7 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, America’s Ownership Society: 
Expanding Opportunities (Aug. 9, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html;  see also E NGEL  &  MCCOY, supra 
note 5, at 21 (commenting that President Bush “advocate[ed] that everyone should own a home as part 
of his vaunted ‘Ownership Society’”); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President 
Hosts Conference on Minority Homeownership (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021015.html (explaining President Bush’s “efforts 
to address the homeownership gap and increase the number of minority homeowners in America”). 
8  See  Raymond C. Niles, Eighty Years in the Making: How Housing Subsidies Caused the 
Financial Meltdown, 6 J.L.  ECON.  &  POL’Y  165, 175–76 (2010) (explaining that the decline in 
residential property values as a result of the collapse of the housing market was “unprecedented, 
exceeding even the decline seen during the Great Depression”).  
9 For analyses of the subprime crisis, see generally ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5; MICHAEL 
LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME 
SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008).  
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One of the striking features of the subprime era is that banks acted 
without adequate regard for state property law.  They were intent on 
serving the national and international financial markets with new and more 
profitable products, and they treated state property law as an obstacle to get 
around rather than a foundation on which to build.  Rather than sell 
mortgages to families that could afford them, they hoodwinked the 
vulnerable by picking their pockets.  Rather than honestly disclose the high 
risks associated with subprime loans, they paid rating agencies to give 
them AAA ratings, inducing investors to take risks they neither were 
prepared for nor understood.
10  The banks made huge amounts of money 
marketing mortgages to people who could not afford to pay them back 
while offloading the risks of such deals onto hapless third parties.
11  And 
rather than observe longstanding laws and customs designed to clarify 
property titles, banks evaded requirements of publicity and formality that 
traditionally governed real estate transactions.
12  In short, the banks misled 
both borrowers and investors while undermining property titles.  This was 
both a clever and a profitable way to engage in business, but it was neither 
honorable nor responsible. 
The participants in this scheme viewed existing practices and legal 
requirements governing real estate transactions as inefficient, costly, 
archaic, and unnecessary technicalities that prevented them from selling 
valuable financial products desired by homeowners and investors alike.  So 
they invented ways to get around these laws and practices.  It is clear they 
did not think through the myriad legal implications of what would happen 
if the housing market crashed.  Nor did they pay sufficient attention to the 
                                                                                                                          
See also Brooksley Born, Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 231, 233 (2011) (explaining the “devastating role that inadequate regulation played in 
causing the financial crisis”). 
10 See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 48–49 (“[T]he SEC began allowing arrangers to pay the 
rating agencies for rating the securities they were underwriting.”); see also LEWIS, supra note 9, at 129 
(“Wall Street firms had conspired with the rating agencies to represent [subprime mortgage-backed 
securities] as a diversified collection of assets . . . .”).  
11 See Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 633–
34 (2008) (recounting how the expansion of subprime lending led to increased “predatory lending,” 
whereby lenders made available mortgage loans “which [were] not suitable or appropriate for the 
borrower, through fraud or deception”); Gregory Zuckerman, Susanne Craig, & Serena Ng, U.S. 
Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud—SEC Alleges Firm Misled Investors on Securities Linked to 
Subprime Mortgages; Firm Vows to Fight the Charges, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, at A1 (“Goldman 
is one of the few the U.S. has accused of misleading investors in the subprime-mortgage debacle . . . . 
As the housing market sank in 2007 and 2008, . . . Goldman was paid about $15 million . . . .”).  
12 See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 24 (describing a common bait-and-switch scheme, 
whereby lenders would describe loan terms to borrowers, only to later “change the terms after the 
borrowers were psychologically and financially invested in the loans”).  Engel and McCoy go on to 
observe: “This was countenanced by federal disclosure laws, which only prohibited lenders from 
changing loan terms if they had made binding offers.  In the subprime market, offers were almost never 
binding.”  Id.  
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details of state property law or the implications of their new marketing 
practices on the clarity of property titles.  They did not do so either because 
they did not anticipate that anything would go wrong or because they 
thought others would bear the losses.  But then the housing market 
crashed—as some predicted it would
13—and the system they invented 
came crashing down with it.  In dealing with the debris left by the crash, 
many state courts are now holding that the marketing and titling 
mechanisms the bankers invented did not comply with state property 
laws.
14  These laws include statutes regulating consumer protection, 
recording, foreclosure, and negotiable instruments, as well as the statute of 
frauds. 
In bypassing and undermining traditional legal rules and practices, the 
banks have created enormous problems for courts, market participants, and 
society as a whole.  By selling adjustable-rate mortgages to millions of 
people who could not afford to pay them back, the banks inflicted novel 
individual and systemic risks.
15  Borrowers and investors participated in 
these markets because they were led to believe the investments were safer 
than they actually were.  The ones who created that impression of safety 
were the bankers that issued the loans and sold the securities.
16  These new 
                                                                                                                          
13 See LEWIS, supra note 9 (detailing the stories of several investment fund managers and a Wall 
Street trader who separately and openly anticipated the crash of the mortgage-backed securities 
market). 
14 See, e.g., Boschma v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc., 129 Cal Rptr. 3d. 874, 893–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) (holding that a bank’s misleading teaser rates violated state property law); Commonwealth v. 
Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 556–61 (Mass. 2008) (explaining bank practices for lending 
were unfair and thus violated state property law). 
15 One study argues, to the contrary, that predatory lending accounted for few defaults relative to 
non-predatory lending.  Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet 
& Douglas D. Evanoff, Predatory Lending and the Subprime Crisis 4 (Ohio St. Univ. Fisher Coll. of 
Bus. Working Paper Series, WP 2012-03-008, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2055889.  
However, the analysis is weak since it is not based on a comparison of similarly-situated borrowers 
who obtained subprime loans versus those who did not or who obtained prime loans.  Instead, it is 
based on a comparison of defaults in an area regulated by an Illinois state-mandated lender-funded 
counseling process for risky borrowers seeking risky loans versus defaults on similar loans in an 
unregulated area.  Id. at 11–14.  While many subprime lenders exited the market in the regulated area, 
the percentage of defaults in the regulated area was only a little bit higher than in the nonregulated area.  
Id. at 23–24.  The study’s authors conclude that predatory lending did not contribute substantially to 
increased default rates, id. at 4, but the study is not capable of supporting such a conclusion.  Instead, 
the study merely shows that loans precluded because of the increased closing costs created by the 
regulation would have had a slightly higher default rate than the loans that were actually made.  Only 
by labeling the precluded loans as “predatory” is the study able to make its claim regarding predatory 
lending.  The problem with this definition is that by almost any measure (including the fact that they 
triggered mandatory counseling) the loans that were actually made would also be deemed predatory. 
 Thus, the study is not actually comparing predatory and non-predatory loans, but predatory loans that 
were still profitable to originate even with mandatory lender-funded counseling and those that were not. 
 The study does not actually tell us about the effect of predatory lending on default rates. 
16 See New York Sues Credit Suisse over Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2012, at B4 (reporting 
on a lawsuit filed against a bank alleging that investors were misled about mortgage-backed securities).  
2013]  FORECLOSURE AND THE FAILURES OF FORMALITY  503 
marketing practices require courts to reinterpret the meaning of 
longstanding consumer protection laws prohibiting unfair or deceptive 
business practices.  They also require legislators and regulators to consider 
what changes may be needed to prevent these practices in the future. 
There is one institution neither the banks nor the subprime market 
could alter and that is the courts.  Judges are now confronting a number of 
crucial questions arising from the subprime markets.  First, courts must 
interpret and apply laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive conduct in 
consumer transactions.  Some courts may be reluctant to characterize 
subprime mortgages as unfair or deceptive on the grounds that “everyone 
was doing it.”  Other courts are recognizing that many mortgage brokers 
and banks actively misled both homeowners and investors about the 
benefits and stability of subprime mortgages.
17  Some courts go further in 
finding that high interest adjustable rate mortgages were not suitable over 
the long run for people who could not afford them.
18  For the same reason, 
they would be justified in finding that the securities based on these risky 
subprime mortgages were not suitable for investors, such as municipalities 
and pension funds, that depend on safe investments.
19  The bankers appear 
to have assumed that subprime mortgages were lawful because no law 
specifically prohibited them.  But they forgot that formal rules are always 
supplemented by equitable standards such as consumer protection and 
securities regulation statutes that prohibit unfair or deceptive business 
practices.
20  They should not have been so quick to assume that it was 
lawful to saddle borrowers with mortgages they could not repay and 
investors with mortgages that were, in truth, ticking time bombs.  The 
courts are confronting hard normative and legal questions about the 
applicability of consumer protection statutes to these transactions. 
Second, courts have been forced to determine how to respond to the 
massive and systemic failure of many banks to keep careful written records 
of mortgage assignments as required by the statute of frauds in every state.  
In attempting to lower the costs of mortgage transactions, the banks 
devised a privatized form of recording mortgage agreements known as 
Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems (MERS), which allowed them 
                                                                                                                          
17 See Ben Protess, U.S. Accuses Bank of America of a ‘Brazen’ Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 24, 2012, at A1 (explaining an allegation that Bank of America acted recklessly in issuing and 
forcing tax payers to guarantee billions in bad loans). 
18 See, e.g., Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d at 556, 558 (finding mortgage lending practices 
unfair because bank knew or should have known that the borrower would default on the loan). 
19 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 2 Banks to Settle Case for $417 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
2012, at B1 (explaining settlements reached as a result of legal action taken over banks’ misstatements 
to investors in risky mortgage securities). 
20 See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 
2225–32 (2007) (detailing a variety of statutes which prohibit unfair or deceptive business practices in 
the area of mortgages).  
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to be prolific about securitizing those mortgages but complacent about 
formalizing mortgage assignments.
21  The result was that the banks made 
many, many mistakes in keeping track of these transactions.
22  F o r m a l  
records of mortgage transfers are often incomplete or incorrect; the chain 
of title for many properties appears to be irretrievably broken.
23  The new 
procedures invented by the banks created title problems that the courts had 
never confronted before, and on such a massive scale as to have the 
potential to destabilize the entire housing market as well as the general 
economy.  Not only have underwater mortgages helped prevent recovery 
from the recession,
24 but the banks’ collective failure to comply with 
traditional property law has left real estate titles in shambles. 
Worse still, the new procedures the banks established made it 
impossible for potential buyers to consult public recording offices to 
determine the state of title on any piece of property.  The privatization of 
mortgage transactions impedes the alienability of land.  In bypassing 
public recording systems, the banks have wrecked the well-functioning 
U.S. recording systems that had supported our property infrastructure since 
the offices were first established in the mid-seventeenth century colonial 
Massachusetts Bay.
25 
Because the banks combined new procedures with sloppy record 
keeping, the courts now find themselves between a rock and a hard place.  
Traditional rules were intended to clarify property titles, but the banks’ 
combination of cleverness and incompetence means that property titles will 
be clouded whether the courts strictly enforce the statute of frauds or relax 
its formality requirements.  The traditional rules and requirements created 
a legal infrastructure that enabled property markets to work well.  The 
                                                                                                                          
21 Nolan Robinson, Note, The Case Against Allowing Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc. (MERS) to Initiate Foreclosure Proceedings, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1622–23 (2011). 
22 See David A. Dana, Why Mortgage “Formalities” Matter, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 505, 
505–06 (2012) (noting myriad mistakes in foreclosure procedures); Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title 
Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: The Ibanez Time Bomb?, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
111, 119–24 (2013) (reviewing evidence of inadequate documentation of mortgage transactions); Alan 
M. White, Losing the Paper—Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 475–76, 488 (2012) (documenting failures to correctly handle note and 
mortgage assignments, as well as rampant inaccuracies in MERS records). 
23 See Dana, supra note 22, at 512–13 (identifying factors contributing to an “unresolved chain-
of-title problem in both notes and mortgages”). 
24 See John Vogel, Editorial, Thinking Outside the Housing Bubble, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
ECON.  INTELLIGENCE  BLOG (June 17, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-
intelligence/2013/06/14/housing-bubble-or-credit-bubble-it-matters (“It is an oversimplification to 
focus solely on the housing market as either the cause of the Great Recession or the only reason for the 
slow recovery.  However, it did play a large role in both and we need to take steps to prevent this 
pattern from happening again.”). 
25 See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2010) (“[I]n 1636 the General Court of 
Massachusetts’ Plymouth Bay Colony adopted its first recording law . . . .”).  
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banks’ willful evasion of those practices and laws created precisely the 
results the tradition would have predicted: titles have become clouded and 
even unmarketable.
26  But, contrary to first instincts, we cannot solve the 
problem simply by strictly enforcing the traditional rules.  The evasion of 
property law was so pervasive that rigid enforcement of the statute of 
frauds would destabilize property titles as badly as relaxing it would do.  
We would be cutting off our noses to spite our faces.  The fix for the 
banks’ failure to follow the rules of formality cannot be to wholly ignore 
transactions that did not follow those rules; this would leave existing 
owners with titles that are clouded rather than clear.
27  Courts adjudicating 
foreclosure cases are left with conundrums that have no easy resolution. 
All this means that courts must reinterpret existing rules to fit the 
current circumstances.  It also means that we may need legislatures to 
enact changes to banking and negotiable instruments law as well as to 
mortgage and foreclosure law.  More fundamentally, participants in the 
real estate market need to change their attitude toward property law.  The 
bankers approached the law the way Holmes’s “bad man” would, seeking 
to get away with everything they could on the assumption that anything 
that is not expressly prohibited must be lawful.
28  It would have been better 
if they had acted responsibly by considering the purpose behind the law, 
instead of just examining the letter of the law to determine what they could 
get away with.  That would require understanding the history of mortgage 
law and the reasons for the regulations we have. 
Courts have historically assumed the role of monitoring mortgages to 
ensure fundamental fairness and to avoid unnecessary forfeiture of 
property.
29  They have done so not only to protect borrowers but also to 
ensure that the property system as a whole functions in an appropriate 
manner.  The history of mortgage law from the Middle Ages on is one of 
strict regulation, followed by efforts to avoid regulation, followed by new 
regulation, ad infinitum.
30  Property law is intended to clarify title and the 
rules of the game; it protects owners while unleashing property 
development and transfer.  But those rules cannot provide a safe harbor to 
                                                                                                                          
26 See Renuart, supra note 22, at 137 (noting the profound difficulty in accurately identifying the 
proper party in a foreclosure proceeding under modern practices and systems). 
27 On the complicated normative relationships between formalism and equity, see Nestor M. 
Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L. REV. 389, 393–94 (2013). 
28 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you 
want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the 
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”). 
29 See, e.g., Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 MO. L. REV. 249, 266, 289 (1999) (providing 
examples of intervention by courts to prevent the “harshness of strict foreclosure” and “abusive” or 
“uncontrolled” forfeiture). 
30 See generally id. (providing an excellent history of mortgage law).  
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actions that lead to substantial injustice or disorder.
31  While property law 
cannot work unless it is tolerably predictable, it also cannot work if it 
immunizes actors from consequences for irresponsible schemes.   
Experience and history prove that our need to manage property as a basic 
part of the infrastructure of social and economic life requires flexibility as 
well as formal structures if we are to manage human affairs in a tolerable 
way.  The boundless nature of human ingenuity means that we need 
nuance rather than rigidity if we want legal mechanisms that can protect 
the vulnerable from schemes designed to pick their pockets while 
offloading the social costs of exploitation onto the rest of us.  And 
formality requirements, while crucial to the efficient functioning of 
property markets, can wind up biting us in the face if we do not apply them 
with some flexibility when they fail. 
In Part II, I will explain the failures that arose in the origination, 
transfer, and foreclosure stages of the subprime mortgage market.  The 
main problems were: (1) unfair and deceptive consumer practices; (2) 
failure to formalize mortgage assignments; and (3) privatization of the title 
and recording system. 
In Part III, I will develop principles to guide our response to this attack 
on property law.  Fundamentally, we need a change in attitude about 
regulation.  Contrary to what the bankers thought, property law is not a 
regulatory impediment to efficiency; it is the foundational infrastructure 
that allows property and property markets to exist.  I will argue that 
mortgage law is governed by two basic principles: (1) protect consumers; 
and (2) ensure that we have a secure legal infrastructure for our property 
system.  I will propose some remedies for our current conundrums that 
promote these norms.  I will suggest ways courts might handle some of the 
perplexing foreclosure cases still in the pipeline, and I will propose some 
legislative changes that might prevent these problems from recurring in the 
future.  I will leave for others to handle needed changes in banking, 
securities, and negotiable instruments law, instead focusing on consumer 
protection, mortgage, and foreclosure law.  
Part IV concludes by noting that the foreclosure crisis reminds us that 
we have an obligation to act responsibly and honorably, not only because 
we have a moral and legal obligation to treat others with due respect, but in 
order to preserve the infrastructure of our property system that is the 
foundation of our wealth and tranquility. 
II.  SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CONUNDRUMS 
To understand the dilemmas courts currently face in foreclosure cases, 
                                                                                                                          
31 For a description of the banks’ continuing efforts to seek such safe harbors, see Peter Eavis, 
Banks Seek a Shield in Mortgage Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at B1.  
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we must understand the bank practices that bypassed or undermined 
traditional property law rules.  Those include: (1) unfair and deceptive 
consumer practices; (2) failures to formalize mortgage assignments in clear 
written records; and (3) privatization of public land records related to 
mortgages. 
A.  Unfair and Deceptive Consumer Practices 
The subprime crisis was not just a typical market bubble.  It happened 
because banks developed a business model that exploited vulnerable 
people by leading them to take out loans they could not afford.  If they had 
had adequate information about what they were getting themselves into, 
they would have run the other way.  And even if they understood and were 
willing to take those risks, subprime loans posed undue risks to third 
parties.
32  Subprime mortgages were an innovation designed to fail, 
harming both those who bought them and the rest of us as well. 
Once upon a time, banks would not lend money to people who could 
not pay it back.  You had to qualify for a loan.  The banks cared about your 
income, your credit history, and even your reputation in the community.  If 
you could not make your mortgage payments, the bank would have to 
foreclose, and banks historically lost half their investment if they had to 
foreclose.
33  But then the banks figured out a way to make money by 
loaning it to people who could not pay it back.  They took advantage of the 
fact that property values were rising and that mortgages could be bundled 
and securitized.  The banks made money, not by slowly recouping 
mortgage payments over thirty years, but by selling the mortgage rights 
immediately to someone else, thereby off-loading the risk of nonpayment 
onto a third party.
34  The bank would make its money immediately while 
transferring the risk to someone who might or might not understand how 
great the risk was.
35  For all this work, people had to be convinced to take 
out loans they could not pay back and investors had to be convinced that 
the loans were safe.  How to accomplish all this?  
The loans were made affordable initially by using adjustable interest 
rates.
36  Borrowers felt comfortable paying the initial low interest rates.  
They either did not know about the later, higher rates, or they were assured 
that rising property values meant that they could either refinance the loan 
                                                                                                                          
32 On the link between predatory lending practices and predatory securitization practices, see 
Peterson, supra note 20, at 2220. 
33 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 4. 
34 White, supra note 22, at 471. 
35 See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 41 (explaining how securitization gave lenders the 
benefit of being paid in advance, while most borrowers were ill-informed on the loans they were 
taking). 
36 Id. at 10.  
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or sell the property at a profit when the higher interest rates kicked in.
37  
The system was, for a time, self-reinforcing.  Promoting investment in real 
estate by making mortgage loans to borrowers who could not have 
previously qualified for them helped fuel a housing bubble.
38  G r e a t e r  
demand for housing led to steadily increasing housing values, which would 
enable high-risk borrowers to sell or refinance when adjustable rate 
mortgages raised monthly payments to unaffordable levels.
39 
Investors bought securities in subprime loans because they earned high 
rates of interest.  They were induced to do so because the banks took 
advantage of mixed messages and inconsistent arguments.  On one hand, 
the securities paid high rates because the loans were risky.  On the other 
hand, the banks suggested that the risk was apparent rather than real.  The 
loans were not really risky because rising property values made them a 
sure thing.  And even if some defaults might happen, securitization spread 
the risk because the loans would not all default at once.  The cherry on top 
was the AAA rating given by trusted, professional rating agencies that 
investors relied upon in making their investment decisions.
40  
Little did the investors know that the banks hired the rating agencies, 
thereby making the rating agencies’ fees dependent on doing what the 
sellers of the securities wanted; obviously what they wanted was AAA 
ratings for the securities to induce investors to buy the securities in the 
mortgage bundles.
41  Rather than doing a complete evaluation of the 
mortgage-backed securities they were being asked to rate, the rating 
agencies relied on the securities arrangers to conduct “due diligence.”
42  
Worse still, the arrangers found the securities to be sound, not because they 
were safe investments deserving of a AAA rating but merely because the 
packaged loans adhered to the lender’s guidelines.
43  The rating agencies 
                                                                                                                          
37 Id. 
38 Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 
1180–82 (2012). 
39 Id. at 1182. 
40 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 5–6 (“[M]any investors relied on rating agencies’ grades of 
the quality of mortgage-backed bonds, in the belief that investment grade bonds were good 
investments.”); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory 
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1012–14, 1022–24 
(2006) (explaining the role of the rating agencies in promoting subprime mortgages). 
41 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 49–51. 
42 Id. at 48. 
43 Id. at 46; see Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. Accuses S. & P. of Fraud in 
Suit on Loan Bundles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A1 (reporting on the Justice Department’s civil suit 
against Standard & Poor’s for defrauding or misleading investors by making investments in mortgage-
related securities seem safer than they actually were); Mary Williams Walsh & Ron Nixon, S. & P. E-
Mails on Mortgage Crisis Show Alarm and Gallows Humor,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Feb. 6, 2013, at A1 
(discussing rating agency correspondence suggesting agency knowledge that mortgage-related 
securities being rated as safe were actually of low quality); see also John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun 
Tang,  Did Subjectivity Play a Role in CDO Credit Ratings?,  67  J.  FIN.  1293, 1325–26 (2012) 
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also helped the arrangers game the system by telling them what they 
needed to do to get a AAA rating, and it was possible to arrange the loans 
in a manner that satisfied the rating agencies’ AAA formula without a 
reasonable belief that the securities were actually safe.
44  What all this 
meant was that a AAA rating no longer meant a safe investment; what it 
actually meant was “buyer beware.”  
Banks therefore changed the substantive terms on which they made 
mortgage loans in conjunction with the way they made money from 
mortgages.  The entire business model switched from long-term repayment 
of mortgage loans by those who were likely to be able to make the 
payments (with foreclosure available as an unusual and secure backup in 
case of default) to a short-term market dependent on risky borrowers and 
compliant investors.
45  None of this would have been possible unless both 
homeowners and investors had been misled into believing these 
investments were safer than anyone had a right to believe.
46  
Nor was any of this unforeseeable.  There were individuals who 
understood that subprime mortgages were bound to fail.
47  The banks 
scoffed at the skeptics but we know now that it was the bankers, and not 
the skeptics, who were living in a dream world where black is white.  The 
bankers should have known better.    And that means that the subprime 
mortgage market was built on fraudulent or quasi-fraudulent business 
practices.  The banks used procedures for mortgage creation and marketing 
that obscured the real terms of the mortgages as well as their inherent 
risk.
48  They misled both borrowers and investors not by outright lies but 
by a combination of puffery and misdirection.
49  They thought they were 
safe as long as they did not lie or make affirmative misstatements.  They 
thought they were acting within the bounds of the law as long as they could 
not find any clear, formal legal regulation that prohibited their conduct. 
                                                                                                                          
(explaining that even when a rating agency revised its views about the safety of mortgage-backed 
securities (CDOs), it failed to reclassify older issues as less than AAA). 
44 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 50. 
45 See JAMES R. BARTH, TONG LI, WENLING LU, TRIPHON PHUMIWASANA & GLENN YAGO, THE 
RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
MARKET MELTDOWN 50–51 (2009) (describing the shift in the mortgage market from long-term, risk 
sensitive borrowers to short-term, risk ignorant borrowers). 
46 See Born, supra note 9, at 23–24 (determining that one reason banks leant to risky borrowers 
was because they “passed on the risks of the loans and had little incentive to maintain high lending 
standards”). 
47 See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 61 (“The truth is, many saw it coming . . . .”); 
LEWIS, supra note 9, at 15 (recounting how Steve Eisman correctly foresaw the subprime crisis ten 
years before it happened by understanding the implications of loaning money to people who could not 
pay it back). 
48 See BARTH ET AL., supra note 45, at 51, 53, 55 (describing the marketing efforts of lenders to 
entice borrowers into loans that they could not afford if home prices declined).  
49 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 9, at 17 (recounting an example of a bank charging a 12.5% 
interest rate but telling the consumer it was an “effective interest rate” of 7%).  
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They felt comfortable doing this because the ideology of freedom of 
contract suggests that we view the agreements as voluntary.  No one forced 
anyone to take out these mortgages; if the borrowers and investors wanted 
to invest in risky loans, who was to say they should not have the freedom 
to do so, as long as no law prohibited the transaction?  The problem, of 
course, is that the banks acted like Holmes’s “bad man” who wants to 
know what the formal law prohibits and then is content to “walk the line” 
and engage in behavior that contravenes the spirit of the law.
50  T h i s  
problem leads courts and legislatures to protect both consumers and the 
public interest by making the edges of rules fuzzy. 
Federal securities law prohibits any misleading communication in 
connection with the sale of securities and requires disclosure in order to 
avoid being misleading.
51  In addition, both state consumer protection laws 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibit “unfair or deceptive 
practices.”
52  Those laws had not previously been applied to mortgage 
loans, but they were in force at the time the subprime market got off the 
ground, and some courts have found it to be “unfair” to sell someone a 
mortgage you know cannot pay it back.
53  The banks wrongly adopted a 
formalistic conception of law.  They thought that whatever was not clearly 
prohibited must be allowed.  They treated the law as a rule-based system 
that created a safe harbor for their questionable activities and failed to 
engage in the moral reflection required of the standards-based law that was 
applicable to their conduct.
54 
In addition to misleading both borrowers and investors, the banks 
failed to prepare adequately for the results of the massive foreclosures that 
resulted from the market they created.  As foreclosures multiplied and the 
housing bubble burst and lowered property values, the banks began to own 
                                                                                                                          
50 Holmes, supra note 28, at 459. 
51 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (stating that it is unlawful to use 
any “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the sale of any security); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013) (stating that it is unlawful, in connection with the sale of any security, to 
“defraud” or “to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading”).  
52 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(a); see Joseph William Singer, 
Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 155 
(2012) (“Every state has a consumer protection law that prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices by businesses.”). 
53 Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 556–61 (Mass. 2008). 
54 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1214‒17, 1219‒29 (2010) (arguing that vague standards can guide action 
through inducing moral reflection); see also Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action 
11‒19 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-81, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1699963 (same).  
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many housing properties that they could not sell.
55  The banks were not 
equipped to handle the situation.  They normally had few foreclosures and 
were able to sell properties quickly after foreclosure.  However, now they 
were forced by economic circumstances to hold onto properties after 
foreclosure, and they were not prepared to undertake the legal obligations 
of real estate owners.  The banks became landlords for the foreclosed 
homeowners or their tenants, but many failed to comply with local housing 
codes and the warranty of habitability.
56  They denied that they were 
“landlords,” but of course they were.  They sometimes violated the legal 
rights of tenants to have habitable housing and housing code compliance.
57 
When foreclosed properties became vacant, the banks were not 
equipped to ensure their upkeep and safety.  Many properties were allowed 
to deteriorate—causing nuisances in many areas and harming the interests 
of neighboring property owners and the municipalities in which those 
properties were located.
58  The banks’ failure to foresee the results of the 
subprime crisis not only led them to ignore the substantive rights of tenants 
to safe and habitable housing but the rights of neighboring owners to be 
free from nuisances.  And of course, the whole thing wrecked the world 
economy, diminishing the amounts in many private college and pension 
funds and the value of stocks held by universities and private investors.  
The loss of jobs and the continuing recession have caused untold suffering.  
The failure to foresee the consequences of misleading consumer marketing 
has unfairly wreaked havoc on many lives. 
To respond to these problems, we need both more and less formality.  
We need more formality because clearer disclosure requirements might 
                                                                                                                          
55  See, e.g., VIRAL  V.  ACHARYA,  MATTHEW  RICHARDSON,  STIJN  VAN  NIEUWERBURGH  & 
LAWRENCE J. WHITE, GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE DEBACLE OF 
MORTGAGE FINANCE 84‒86, 92‒94 (2011) (discussing the widespread drop in home prices across the 
country from 2004 to 2010, the resulting losses being borne by creditors, and their inability to sell these 
homes); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 70 (“By spring 2007, it was official: the United 
States was in a housing bust.  In the first quarter of 2007, housing prices declined nationwide . . . . For 
borrowers facing difficulty making monthly payments, falling home prices severely limited their 
options. . . . Another solution was to pay off the loan by selling the home, but falling home prices 
eliminated that option for many people as well.”). 
56 Aarti Shahani, With Banks as Landlords, Some Tenants Neglected, NPR (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/23/147160871/with-banks-as-landlords-some-tenants-neglected;  see 
Creola Johnson, Fakers, Breachers, Slackers, and Deceivers: Opportunistic Actors During the 
Foreclosure Crisis Deserve Criminal Sanctions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 867‒69, 876 (2012) (labeling 
banks as “Slackers” for intentionally failing to maintain foreclosed properties in violation of local 
housing codes in many instances, which caused crime to fester in the surrounding communities). 
57 See Johnson, supra note 56, at 867–69 (discussing a judge’s method of using civil contempt to 
compel “slacker” banks and real estate speculators to comply with local housing codes for foreclosed 
properties that they own); Shahani, supra note 56 (“Some banks are failing to follow local and state 
housing codes, leaving tenants to live in squalor . . . .”). 
58 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 143 (“When far-off entities end up owning homes after 
foreclosure, they often lack incentives to adequately maintain the property.”).  
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induce fewer people to enter risky transactions like these.  This is one of 
the goals championed by Senator Elizabeth Warren: better disclosure 
requirements for consumer debt transactions.
59  Beyond disclosure 
requirements, we may need to protect consumers, banks, and the general 
public from toxic loans likely to harm the whole society by regulating 
mortgage transactions to ensure they are sold only to those who can afford 
them. 
On the other hand, we need less formality because we need businesses 
like banks to understand that practices that are not clearly prohibited by 
formal laws might nonetheless be unlawful.  Consumer protection laws 
deliberately use vague and normatively charged language, outlawing all 
“unfair practices.”  They do so in order to induce businesses to imagine 
whether they can justify themselves to a jury or a judge. 
B.  Failures to Formalize Transactions and Clarify Title 
The subprime crisis has been hard to fix because of myriad failures to 
comply with basic formal requirements of state real property law.  The 
procedures for transferring interests in property—including mortgages—
were simple and clear.  First, put property transactions in writing.  Second, 
record them in the registry of deeds for the county in which the property is 
located.  How hard could that be?  These rules have been in effect in the 
United States for hundreds of years.  The first statute of frauds was passed 
in England in 1677.
60  The General Court of Massachusetts’ Plymouth Bay 
Colony established its first recording law in 1636.
61  These legal 
regulations should be neither surprising nor controversial.  Their purpose is 
to clarify title to property and to make a public record of that title available 
so potential purchasers and government entities know who claims an 
interest in any piece of real estate.  Clear titles are essential because we 
will be deterred from using or developing property if we do not know who 
owns it.  We will neither buy property from someone who may not own it, 
nor sell our own property if we cannot assure buyers that they will get what 
we purport to give them. 
Recording of property transactions is generally not required to effect a 
transfer of title or to grant a mortgage in property.
62  A deed or a mortgage 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8, 9–10, available 
at  http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf (arguing that just as buyers of consumer 
products enjoy regulatory protection from the marketing of dangerous tangible goods, consumers of 
financial products are entitled to similar protection from unreasonable levels of risk and misleading 
advertising or contractual terms). 
60 JOHN F. BAKER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES OF GOODS, WARES AND MERCHANDISE AS 
AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 2 (1887). 
61 Peterson, supra note 25, at 1364. 
62 SINGER, supra note 4, § 12.3.3.1, at 877.   
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validly created and delivered effects a transfer of property rights.
63  The 
same is true of subsequent sales or assignments of the mortgage.   
Nonetheless, the rules governing the recording system create strong 
incentives to record interests in real property because doing so protects the 
buyer from fraudulent or duplicate transfers or encumbrances.
64  F o r  
similar reasons, mortgages are ordinarily recorded. 
Mortgage assignments, however, constitute a special case.  Mortgages 
create a security interest in property to ensure payment of an underlying 
debt that is formalized in a note.
65  Negotiable instruments law in Article 3 
of the Uniform Commercial Code may cover most mortgage notes,
66 
although the law in this respect is amazingly unclear.  Those notes may be 
transferred the way one transfers rights in a personal check.  One can 
endorse the note by signing it and giving the note to the transferee, endorse 
it to the order of a particular person, or endorse it in blank with the name of 
the transferee to be filled in later.
67  Alternatively, one can simply transfer 
the note without endorsing it while providing independent evidence that 
the recipient is being granted the right to enforce the note.
68  If the right to 
enforce the note is transferred, the transferee would also want to be able to 
use the mortgage foreclosure process to enforce that obligation.  In general, 
whoever has rights in the note also has rights to the mortgage method of 
enforcing the note (i.e., foreclosure).
69  If one were careful about all this, a 
mortgage assignment would be drafted and recorded while the note would 
be endorsed and delivered to the mortgage assignee.  But the banks were 
not careful about any of this. 
While the incentive to record deeds has always been strong, the 
incentive to record mortgage assignments has been less strong in many 
states.
70  That is because the states allow the possessor of the note (or 
someone who can show they are entitled to enforce the note) to foreclose 
on the property even if there is no mortgage assignment.
71  The subprime 
market involved numerous transfers of mortgages.  If the banks had 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. § 9.3.1.1, at 779. 
64 Id. § 9.3.3.1, at 783. 
65 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 4–5 (2009). 
66 See U.C.C. § 3-104 (2011) (outlining the requirements for a mortgage note to constitute a 
negotiable instrument). 
67 See id. § 3-205 (describing different types of endorsements). 
68 Dale A. Whitman, A Proposal for a National Mortgage Registry: MERS Done Right, 78 MO. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 29) (on file with author). 
69 See id. at 16 (“[U]nder traditional mortgage law, having the right to foreclose depends on 
holding the obligation represented by the note, not on having an assignment of the mortgage, recorded 
or not.”). 
70 Id. at 22. 
71 See Christopher J. DeCosta, US Bank v. Ibanez: The Mortgage Industry’s Documentation 
Practices in Focus, 55 BOS. B.J. 23, 23 (2011) (highlighting “widespread” use of post-foreclosure 
mortgage assignments).  
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foreseen the millions of foreclosures that would occur, they might also 
have foreseen that courts would seek assurances that the bank seeking to 
foreclose had a right to do so.  If they had foreseen that, they would have 
kept careful records of mortgage assignments; they would have ensured 
easy and assured access to the underlying note, either by keeping it 
themselves or giving it to a custodian who could find the note when 
needed; they would have endorsed the notes correctly and completely; and 
they would have recorded mortgage assignments to give homeowners a 
way to find out who currently held rights in their mortgages and the notes 
to facilitate negotiation in cases of default.  But none of that happened. 
Property arrangements are among society’s most formal transactions.  
Because of the importance of clear title to property, the law requires or 
encourages a high degree of formality to property transactions.  By both 
custom and law, property transfers must be reduced to a writing and 
ownership interests should be made public through use of the recording 
system.  We generally assume that formalities promote clarity and avoid 
misunderstandings and disputes.  We assume that people know the law and 
comply with it, and that, if they do not, they suffer the consequences of 
having failed to adequately formalize their transactions.  Holding people to 
the rules is thought to be a powerful incentive to induce them to learn the 
law and comply with it.  That, in turn, will promote clear and mutually 
understood contractual and property arrangements. 
But formalities often fail.  Why?  While ignorance of the law is no 
excuse, it is extremely common for people to ignore or fail to comply with 
the statute of frauds.  Sometimes this happens because of negligence.  A 
building contractor may misread building plans or put the borders of 
property in the wrong place.  Sometimes it happens because of the cost or 
difficulty of finding out what the law is or because social custom diverges 
from legal requirements.  A home purchaser may not hire a surveyor when 
purchasing property to ensure that the written records accord with the 
borders on the ground.  It may not be customary to pay for such a survey.  
Moreover, oral agreements among neighbors about borders may be the 
norm; indeed, seeking to reduce such understandings to writing may insult 
the neighbor and indicate mistrust.  I myself talked to my neighbor about 
where our border was before building a fence around our backyard, both of 
us agreeing to eschew the costs of a formal survey.  Property law 
recognizes the disjunction between possession and formal title through 
myriad doctrines such as adverse possession, prescriptive easements, oral 
agreement, acquiescence, and estoppel. 
The banks did not have any of these excuses.  The rules were simple 
and clear: put your transaction in writing and, if you want to ensure that 
there are no disputes about who owns what, keep track of the writing and 
record your interest.  Yet this simple, clear system failed.  The rules were 
clear but the bankers did not follow them.  They wanted to make money  
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through securitization, which requires multiple transfers of multiple 
mortgages.  That would be costly and cumbersome if each mortgage 
assignment had to be reduced to writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of 
frauds and a fee paid to record each in the relevant local registry of deeds.  
So the banks invented MERS, the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems.
72  This corporation was designed to stand in for the real parties in 
interest in mortgage transactions and allow them to avoid recording 
mortgage assignments every time those mortgages were transferred.
73  In 
the olden days, if you borrowed money from Bank of America to buy a 
house, you signed a note that constituted a contract between you and the 
bank stating the amount of the loan and the repayment terms.  You also 
gave the bank a mortgage to the property, allowing the lender to foreclose 
on the property in either a judicial or a nonjudicial proceeding if you 
defaulted on your mortgage payments.  That mortgage document would 
name Bank of America as the mortgagee and it would be recorded.  If 
Bank of America assigned its rights in the mortgage to another bank, a 
written mortgage assignment would be drafted, signed, and recorded, and 
the note would be endorsed (signed) and transferred to the possession of 
the new mortgage holder.  While it is true that recording of the mortgage 
assignment was not required, it was advisable to do so both to protect 
against fraudulent transfers and to ensure public notice of encumbrances 
attached to the land. 
Instead of doing this, the MERS system allowed the original mortgage 
to be placed in the name of MERS rather than Bank of America.
74  If you 
went to the public registry of deeds to see if there were any liens or 
encumbrances on the property, all you would see was that the owner had 
granted a mortgage to MERS as “nominee” for Bank of America (the 
original lender).
75  Theoretically, MERS would keep an electronic database 
that would list Bank of America as the real mortgagee of the property; it 
would also list the name of any loan servicer hired by Bank of America to 
collect the mortgage payments from the homeowner.
76  When Bank of 
America transferred the note and mortgage to a second bank—say, 
                                                                                                                          
72 See White, supra note 22, at 486 (explaining how MERS operates); Robinson, supra note 21, at 
1621–23 (explaining the creation of MERS). 
73  About Us,  MORTGAGE  ELECTRONIC  REGISTRATION  SYS.,  INC., www.mersinc.org/about-
us/about-us (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
74 See Robinson, supra note 21, at 1623–24 (discussing capacity for foreclosure in MERS’s name 
instead of actual owners’ names); Frequently Asked Questions, MORTGAGE  ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYS., INC., www.mersinc.org/about-us/faq#whatdoesmersasoriginal (last visited Sept. 
22, 2013) [hereinafter MERS FAQs] (explaining MERS mortgage contracts to grant mortgagee rights 
and status to MERS itself). 
75 Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System’s Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.  111, 118 (2011); White, supra note 22, at 485; 
Robinson, supra note 21, at 1622. 
76 White, supra note 22, at 485; Robinson, supra note 21, at 1623.  
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Cambridge Trust—the theory was that Cambridge Trust would notify 
MERS and MERS would change the name of the mortgagee for that 
property on its books.  Nothing would need to be changed in the public 
registry of deeds, however; since MERS was holding the mortgage as the 
“nominee” for the real owner, no new recording would be needed.
77  Yet 
MERS also maintained, inconsistently, that it was both the mortgagee and 
merely the “nominee” (a limited agent) for the real mortgagee.
78  T h i s  
system effectively created a national electronic registry for mortgages, 
bypassing the need for new paper assignments recorded in the various state 
registries of deeds with their attendant fees.  Using this method, the banks 
thought they could both comply with state recording acts and avoid the 
costs and complexity associated with them. 
The MERS system failed in several ways, all predictable from the 
start.
79  First, the banks apparently did not carefully research state property 
law.  They operated in the context of a national or international securities 
market, and did not focus on the fact that property law is state law.
80  Every 
state has a Uniform Commercial Code that regulates negotiable 
instruments, and many courts interpret those laws to apply to most housing 
loan notes.
81    Every state has statutes that allow for and regulate the 
recording of real property titles and mortgages.  Every state has statutes 
that regulate the foreclosure process.  The states’ laws are not uniform.
82  It 
might be possible to develop a business model that would satisfy the rules 
of every state, which the banks that established MERS clearly thought they 
had accomplished.  In retrospect, it is clear that they did not understand or 
                                                                                                                          
77 Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency, and 
Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 551, 559–60 (2011). 
78  See id. at 559–85  (analyzing conflicting theories about MERS’s role in the mortgage 
transactions); see also Peterson, supra note 75, at 118–25 (explaining the problems that arise from 
these inconsistent claims); Robinson, supra note 21, at 1645 (“[F]rom a legal standpoint, MERS cannot 
simultaneous [sic] be both principal and agent . . . .”). 
79 See David Waks, Mortgage Electronic Registration Suspense: What’s Happening 4, 9, 11–12, 
17, 19 (Feb. 1, 2011)  (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2197135 
(detailing myriad foreclosure issues generated by the MERS system). 
80 See generally id. (highlighting the extreme differences among state courts’ handling of MERS 
litigation). 
81 See, e.g., In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 282 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (“There is abundant legal 
authority for the proposition that mortgage notes, such as the one involved in this matter, [for a 
residential real estate property] are negotiable instruments governed by article 3 of the U.C.C.”); In re 
Edwards, No. 11-23195, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5065, at *12–17 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. Dec. 23, 2011) 
(finding a promissory note to be a negotiable instrument as per the U.C.C.); Army Nat’l Bank v. Equity 
Developers, Inc., 774 P.2d 919, 930 (Kan. 1989) (holding Article 9 of the U.C.C. to apply to 
mortgages); David C. Hill, Assignment of Mortgage Notes Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
MICH. REAL PROP. REV., Summer 2012, at 11, 12 (“[T]he enforcement of negotiable instruments . . . 
arises under Article 3 of the U.C.C., which has been adopted, in some variation, by every state.”).  
82  See Andra Ghent, America’s Mortgage Laws in Historical Perspective 1 (Jan.  20, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2166656 
(detailing differences among state mortgage laws).  
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research the complexities of state foreclosure law.  Foreclosure litigation is 
now revealing that the MERS system, as implemented by the banks, often 
did not comply with the requirements of the laws of the several states.
83 
Second, the MERS system made the banks complacent.  They thought 
that if they ever had to foreclose, then MERS could either bring the 
foreclosure proceedings itself or MERS could assign the mortgage to the 
real party in interest and that party (or the loan servicer) could conduct the 
foreclosure.
84  The banks did not think there was a reason to have a clear 
chain of title showing the written mortgage assignments from the first 
mortgagee to the current one that was seeking to foreclose.
85  Nor were 
they sufficiently careful about endorsing and storing the underlying note so 
that it would be accessible if needed for foreclosure.
86  The banks also 
securitized and transferred so many mortgages that they made mistakes in 
record keeping.
87  Their records are incomplete in some cases and 
inaccurate in others.
88  They failed to carefully document all the mortgage 
transfers and they lost or misplaced notes.
89  They overly relied on the 
MERS mechanism.  In the past, the courts had always been solicitous of 
the banks.
90  Most homeowners never contested foreclosures because they 
were indeed behind in their payments and neither the borrowers nor the 
courts had any reason to question whether the foreclosing bank had a right 
to do so.
91  
The subprime crisis changed all of this.  When people stopped being 
able to pay the higher interest rates associated with adjustable rate 
                                                                                                                          
83 See, e.g., Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443–45 (E.D. Pa. 
2012) (holding that MERS title system violated Pennsylvania recording statutes); U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53 (Mass. 2011) (finding foreclosure to be improper when a bank 
could not demonstrate clear chain of title to mortgages); Gretchen Morgenson, Guilty Pleas in 
Foreclosure Fraud Cases,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Nov. 21, 2012, at B5 (detailing a foreclosure processing 
company founder that pleaded guilty to a charge of fraudulently preparing false documents to evict 
troubled borrowers from their homes). 
84 Zacks, supra note 77, at 552. 
85 See David E. Woolley & Lisa D. Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of Title 
on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 365, 401 (2012) (claiming banks were aware of gaps 
in the chain of title and intentionally sought protection from liability for invalid title).  
86 See Joshua J. Card, Homebuyer Beware: MERS and the Law of Subsequent Purchasers, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2012) (noting that the “likelihood that MERS cannot identify the true 
owner of a particular mortgage note is quite substantial”).  
87 Woolley & Herzog, supra note 85, at 367. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See Dana, supra note 22, at 510 (noting the difficulty in getting courts to take seriously the 
question of noncompliance by banks with mortgage formalities). 
91  See Timothy A. Froehle, Note, Standing in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Why 
Procedural Requirements Are Necessary to Prevent Further Loss to Homeowners, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
1719, 1738 (2011) (“[M]ost foreclosures go uncontested.”); see also id. at 1739–40 (highlighting the 
difficulty courts have in determining the rights of a bank to foreclose and obtaining proper relief for the 
homeowner).  
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mortgages and the housing bubble burst, making refinancing impossible, 
defaults and foreclosures skyrocketed.
92    For the first time, 
homeowner/borrowers started questioning whether the bank bringing the 
foreclosure action was entitled to recover the property to pay off the debt.  
It is a settled principle of real property law that a peaceable possessor is 
entitled to remain in possession unless someone can prove they have a 
better title.
93  But when MERS began bringing foreclosure proceedings, 
homeowners’ lawyers began to focus on the inconsistent statuses MERS 
claimed for itself.
94  The mortgage documents suggested that MERS 
occupied both the role of mortgagee and the role of nominee for the 
mortgagee.
95  These roles are inconsistent; one cannot be both the principal 
and the agent.  This is a form of property right that is not recognized by the 
courts; it is confusing and contradictory.  The courts, therefore, were put to 
the task of determining what role MERS actually had. 
It became clear that MERS was not the mortgagee, but merely an agent 
for the real mortgagee.  But an agent’s powers cannot exceed those of the 
principal.  For MERS to foreclose, it had to show that it was an agent for 
the real mortgagee.
96  But how could it do that?  It would have to show a 
clear chain of title to the mortgage from the original mortgagee to the 
current mortgagee or it would have to be able to produce the note.
97  
Because its records were unclear or incomplete, it could not always do 
that.
98  Because it was not designed to be a document custodian, it did not 
have possession of the note.  Moreover, like public recording systems, its 
information was only as good as the information it received.  If banks did 
not notify it of mortgage assignments, then its records would be inaccurate 
                                                                                                                          
92  See Kathryn E. Johnson & Carolyn E. Waldrep, The North Carolina Banking Institute 
Symposium on the Foreclosure Crisis: Overview, 14 N.C.  BANKING  INST. 191, 198–99 (2010) 
(highlighting statistics showing the severe increase in delinquent loans and foreclosures).  
93 See, e.g., Garlock v. Fulton Cnty., 176 A. 38, 39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935) (“Possession standing 
alone but unimpeached is evidence of title.  It is the lowest kind of title, but is good against any one not 
having a better one.”). 
94 See Peterson, supra note 75, at 118 (“In litigation all across the country, attorneys representing 
MERS frequently take inconsistent positions on the legal status of the company, depending on the legal 
issue at hand.”).  
95 Whitman, supra note 68, at 39, 43.   
96 Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 46 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (“MERS offers no 
authority for the implicit proposition that the lender’s nomination of MERS as a nominee rises to an 
agency relationship with successor noteholders.  MERS fails to identify the entities that control and are 
accountable for its actions.  It has not established that it is an agent for a lawful principal.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
97 See Whitman, supra note 68, at 15–17 (indicating that title examiners may desire to locate a 
“recorded chain of title” in order to establish that the “party foreclosing the mortgage is the person with 
the right to do so”). 
98 But see Card, supra note 86, at 1662–63 (arguing that courts should accept MERS as the agent 
for the current mortgagee); Dustin A. Zacks, MERS Is Dead: Long Live MERS, 44 CONN. L. REV. 
CONNTEMPLATIONS 62, 68 (2012) (arguing that courts’ decisions that “hold that language in MERS 
mortgages appointing MERS as agent of nominee is sufficient to permit MERS to foreclose”).  
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or incomplete.  That is in fact what occurred in many cases. 
Some states have allowed MERS to bring foreclosure proceedings in 
its own name.
99  They view the MERS system as beneficial to the real 
estate market and feel that the homeowner has agreed to let MERS act as 
an agent for the real mortgagee—whoever that was.  So they shifted the 
burden of proof onto the homeowner to show that MERS was not acting on 
behalf of the real party in interest.
100  Other courts, however, have refused 
to let MERS bring foreclosure proceedings on the ground that it had no 
title to the property or any interest whatsoever.
101  If you are going to eject 
someone from their home, you have to show you have a better right to their 
property than they do.  But MERS has no property rights of any kind; it 
does not own the mortgage or have a right to enforce the note, and it is not 
the one to whom the loan is owed.
102  Those courts found that MERS could 
not be both the mortgagee and the nominee, and held that it was merely a 
nominee.
103  Because MERS is not the mortgagee, it has no power to 
assign rights in the mortgage to the real owner of the mortgage to enable it 
                                                                                                                          
99 See MINN. STAT. § 507.413 (2012) (providing that if “a mortgage is granted to a mortgagee as 
nominee or agent for a third party identified in the mortgage” then “[a]n assignment, satisfaction, 
release, or power of attorney to foreclose is entitled to be recorded in the office of the county recorder . 
. . and is sufficient to assign, satisfy, release, or authorize the foreclosure of a mortgage”); Gomes v. 
Countrywide Home Loans Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 826–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (MERS may 
initiate nonjudicial foreclosure under deed of trust); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Revoredo, 
955 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (MERS may foreclose as agent of the note holder); 
Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183, 183 (Mich. 2011) (MERS had sufficient 
“interest in the indebtedness” to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings); Jackson v. Mortg. Elect. 
Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Minn. 2009) (applying MINN. STAT. § 507.413 and 
allowing MERS to initiate foreclosure proceedings); cf. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 
F.3d 282, 291–93 (1st Cir. 2013) (MERS possesses a legal interest in the mortgage enabling it to 
transfer the mortgage to the holder of the beneficial interest or the bank that owns the right to foreclose 
to secure the underlying debt). 
100 Mort. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) 
(noting that MERS’s status as agent for the mortgagee or note holder was sufficient to allow it to bring 
a foreclosure action as long as no proof was presented persuasively contesting its right to act as the 
agent for the mortgagee or note holder). 
101 E.g., LaSalle Bank Nat’l. Ass’n v. Lamy, No. 030049/2005, 2006 WL 2251721, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2006); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (Ohio 
2012); Bain, 285 P.3d at 36–37; cf. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., Inc., 301 
S.W.3d 1, 3–5 (Ark. 2009) (stating that MERS has no standing to be involved in foreclosure 
proceedings because it has no interest in the property and can only act as an agent if directed to do so 
by a principal). 
102 See Zacks, supra note 98, at 66 (explaining that MERS does not own the indebtedness and is 
unable to enforce the note). 
103 See, e.g., LaSalle Bank, 2006 WL 2251721, at *1–2 (“[T]his court and others have repeatedly 
held that a nominee of the owner of the note and mortgage, such Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. (MERS), may not prosecute a mortgage foreclosure action in its own name as nominee of 
the original lender because it lacks ownership of the note and mortgage at the time of the prosecution of 
the action.”).  
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to foreclose unless it is acting as the agent for some principal.
104  If it is 
serving as the agent (nominee) for the real mortgagee, it cannot serve in 
that capacity without a clear record of who its principal is.
105  For the same 
reason, some courts refused to allow loan servicers to foreclose unless they 
can show a chain of mortgage assignments giving them the right to 
foreclose as agents for the mortgagee.
106  They are also agents for a 
principal and unless they can show that the principal has rights in the 
mortgage, they are in no better a position than MERS.
107 
That left the current mortgagee to bring the foreclosure proceeding 
itself.  But again, in the case of judicial foreclosures, some courts started 
insisting on proof that the mortgagee actually possessed rights in the 
property at the time the foreclosure proceedings began.
108  Because of the 
sloppy record keeping and the undue reliance on the MERS system, some 
banks could not make that showing.
109  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  n o n j u d i c i a l  
foreclosures, the bank would conduct the foreclosure; usually it would buy 
the property itself at the foreclosure sale.  At that point, title shifted from 
the mortgagor or the deed of trust owner to the foreclosure purchaser 
(usually the bank that thought it held the mortgage).  That new owner 
would then try to evict the homeowner who no longer had title to the 
property.  In these cases, once again, some courts put brakes on the whole 
affair.
110  If the foreclosure was conducted by someone who was not the 
                                                                                                                          
104 Id. at *2–3; Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 539 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).  But 
see In re Relka, No. 09-20806, 2009 WL 5149262, at *4–5 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Dec. 22, 2009) (noting 
that MERS has power to assign the note and mortgage). 
105 Bank of N.Y. v. Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (“A party who claims 
to be the agent of another bears the burden of proving the agency relationship.”).  On the difficulty of 
figuring out what happens when the principal is unclear, see Bain, 285 P.3d at 50. 
106 See In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (holding that an agent cannot 
foreclose without proof of its agency relationship and a showing of the chain of mortgage assignments 
giving its principal a right to foreclose). 
107 See Robinson, supra note 21, at 1644 (“[A]n agent cannot augment or reduce the legal rights 
of its principal.”). 
108 See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (no right to 
foreclose without possession of properly endorsed note); Gee v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 72 So. 3d 211, 
213–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (assignee of a mortgage cannot foreclose when it failed to establish 
how its predecessor became the successor in interest to the prior holder of the mortgage); Deutsche 
Bank Nat’l Trust v. Mitchell, 27 A.3d 1229, 1231 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (same as Gee).  
109 See, e.g., White, supra note 22, at 474–77, 495 (arguing that sloppy treatment of notes was 
widespread, making it difficult for lenders to show properly endorsed notes to prove they had a right to 
foreclose and noting the “extensive inaccuracy of MERS” records).  See generally Bradley T. Borden, 
David J. Reiss & W. KeAupuni Akina, Show Me the Note!, 19 WESTLAW J. BANK & LENDER LIAB. 1 
(2013) (discussing competing state court rulings on the question of whether foreclosure can be avoided 
if the foreclosing party cannot produce the note on which the mortgage is based). 
110 See Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 893–97 (Mass. 2011) (stating that if nonjudicial 
foreclosure is invalid because the foreclosing party could not prove it possessed the right to foreclose, 
then the purchaser at the foreclosure sale cannot transfer good title to a third party); U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49–51 (Mass. 2011) (holding that foreclosure is invalid unless the 
foreclosing party proved a right to possession of the property before the foreclosure occurred, so the 
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real mortgagee, then it had no right to foreclose on the mortgage.
111  You 
can foreclose on your own mortgage but not on someone else’s mortgage.  
I can give you a deed to the Empire State Building and you would get what 
I have the right to sell—which is nothing, since I do not own the Empire 
State Building.  It is a staple of real property law that, absent a statute to 
the contrary (such as recording acts), you cannot convey more than you 
own.
112  So if the bank that conducted the foreclosure did not own the 
mortgage, it could not foreclose and certainly could not transfer title to 
itself as foreclosure buyer.  Since it obtained no title, it now has no right to 
eject the homeowner because it cannot prove it has a better title to the 
property than the peaceably possessing homeowner. 
What to do now?  Courts could strictly enforce the statute of frauds 
and hold that the banks simply cannot foreclose if they cannot prove that 
they “own the mortgage” through showing a clear chain of mortgage 
assignments, possession of an endorsed note, or proof that they are entitled 
to enforce the note, simply cannot foreclose.  They would lose their interest 
in all such properties.  Is that a viable solution to this problem?  One 
problem is that this would reduce the market value of mortgages the bank 
cannot prove it owns to zero.  That, in turn, would reduce the capital held 
by the bank and require it to replace that capital if it needed to meet 
regulatory requirements to have a certain amount of money on hand.  If it 
cannot replace that capital, there is a chance that the bank could become 
insolvent.  If this is a problem many banks face, and if many of them 
become insolvent, we could plunge the economy into a second major 
recession unless we bail out the banks a second time. 
A second major issue that would arise is that the mortgagee might lose 
its interests in the mortgage, but this would not necessarily clear title for 
the borrower/mortgagor.  There would still appear to be an undischarged 
mortgage on the books in MERS’s name.  That means that the property 
still appears to be encumbered by a mortgage.  Just because the current 
mortgagee cannot prove it has title does not mean a prior assignee of the 
mortgage could not show a complete chain of title.  So the current 
mortgagee could go back to the bank it purchased the mortgage from and 
                                                                                                                          
subsequent purchaser could not prove that it acquired good title sufficient to claim rights against the 
current possessor). 
111 Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial 
Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1500 (2004) (“A sale is also void when the foreclosing party did 
not own the note . . . .”); see also Robinson, supra note 21, at 1637 (stating that the law in most states 
requires the foreclosing party to show proof of ownership before beginning foreclosure proceedings).  
112 See, e.g., 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 277 (2011) (“A landowner cannot convey by deed a greater 
interest in property than he or she possesses.”); Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, 
Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript 
at 16) (on file with author) (stating that in contract and property law a transferee acquires only the 
rights that the transferor had in the contract or property).  
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get a written assignment, but it would have to get information about the 
full chain of title for this to work.  What would induce the prior bank to 
give the new written assignment?  Suppose the prior bank also does not 
have a full chain of title; what happens then?  Suppose it grants an 
assignment; how is that proof that that bank was entitled to give the 
assignment?  Unless a full chain of mortgage assignments is granted, we 
are still not able to clear title.  Alternatively, someone might find and 
produce the underlying note.  But because contract arrangements might 
have identified someone other than the possessor of the note to be the party 
entitled to enforce the note, we cannot be assured that the possessor is the 
party with the right to foreclose.
113  The fact that two documents are used 
(the note and the mortgage) and the fact that one may be entitled to enforce 
the note either because of possession of the note or because of contractual 
arrangements that give one the right to enforce it, the existing legal rules 
do not clearly identify the party in charge of the mortgage when records of 
mortgage assignments and note endorsements are not complete and 
accurate. 
Now suppose that the prior bank sits on its laurels, happy that it has a 
mortgage it thought it had sold; after all, the transfer was null because it 
was not in writing, or in a writing anyone can find, or which is sufficiently 
detailed to prove the assignment was made.  That bank received money for 
selling the mortgage and now has the mortgage back, as it were, for free.  
Would the bank that bought that mortgage accept this?  No, it would sue 
the earlier bank either for an order to execute a mortgage assignment or it 
would sue the earlier bank for unjust enrichment for taking money for a 
mortgage that it never in fact sold.  And how would the current mortgagee 
ensure that it could get that money?  It might bring a lawsuit against the 
earlier bank and the homeowner and try to slap a lien on the property to 
ensure payment of that obligation.  Thus, we would have a new 
encumbrance on the property arising out of the unjust enrichment lawsuit.  
Title is no closer to being cleared than it was before. 
Suppose the borrower/homeowner is fed up by all this and just wants 
to bring a quiet title action against everyone who might have an interest in 
the property to determine who, if anyone, has a mortgage in it.  Under the 
due process clause, that requires notice to all concerned.
114  But the 
homeowner has no way of knowing who those parties are.  The public 
                                                                                                                          
113 See David P. Weber, The Magic of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System: It Is and It 
Isn’t, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 239, 245–46 (2011) (describing the difficulty of determining the party with 
the right to foreclose due to the resale of notes to parties that are not the mortgagee of record).  
114 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  
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records in the registry of deeds say that the mortgage is held by MERS.
115  
The homeowner could call up MERS and ask for the information on its 
books about the chain of mortgage assignments, but until recently all 
MERS would tell the homeowner was the name of her loan servicer, not 
the current mortgagee or prior holders of the mortgage.
116  Because of 
litigation limiting its power to foreclose, MERS changed its policy several 
years ago and will now “usually” tell the homeowner the identity of the 
bank that MERS records show is the current mortgagee if it has that 
information.
117  In some cases, its records show, not the name of the 
mortgagee, but the “investor” or the entity that pooled the mortgages to 
create mortgage-backed securities.  In that case, MERS cannot reveal the 
name of the mortgagee because all it knows is the identity of the company 
that financed the securitization. 
The 2009 amendments to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) require 
borrowers to be notified when mortgages are assigned.
118  But MERS will 
not generally reveal the chain of title to show all the mortgage assignments 
from the original to the current mortgagee.
119  It is not its policy to do so 
and even if it agreed to do so, because of the banks’ failures to adequately 
track and formalize these transactions or to notify MERS of the 
assignments, that chain is likely to be broken.  So if the homeowner cannot 
find out all the parties who claim an interest in the property, what can she 
do?  Perhaps she can sue MERS and the current mortgagee seeking to 
foreclose (if she knows who that is) or any prior mortgagees she can find 
out about.  She can also post a notice in the newspaper trying to notify all 
others about her claim.  Perhaps this will satisfy due process requirements 
for notice before losing a property right. 
But now we face another problem.  This lawsuit is being brought by 
the homeowner who defaulted on her loan.  Where does she get the money 
to hire a lawyer and pay for the lawsuit?  Perhaps a potential purchaser 
would be willing to pay the cost.  That would only make sense if the 
increased costs for the property associated with a lawsuit, as well as the 
time needed to prosecute a quiet title action, would still make the property 
attractive to the potential buyer.  Perhaps the buyer could simply purchase 
title insurance to facilitate the deal.  That requires a title insurance 
company willing to ensure the title to property for which there are no 
public records of mortgage assignments, i.e., for an unknown risk.  Any of 
                                                                                                                          
115 Merscorp, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 2006) (explaining that MERS is recorded 
as the mortgagee of record in the public records, but subsequent assignments are not publicly recorded 
and are tracked by MERS in its private system).  
116 Robinson, supra note 21, at 1652.  
117 MERS FAQs, supra note 74. 
118 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g) (2012). 
119 Levitin, supra note 112, at 29–30.  
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these solutions increases the costs associated with the property and 
decreases its market value.  All of this impedes alienability. 
The result is that the title to the property is under a significant cloud.  
The property seems to be subject to a mortgage in MERS’s name, but since 
MERS cannot be the mortgagee, the encumbrance on the property cannot 
be clearly identified.
120  Because the banks did not strictly comply with the 
statute of frauds and customary practice under the recording acts, they 
often cannot produce a properly endorsed note.  And because the possessor 
of the note may not be the person entitled to enforce it, some mortgagee at 
some point could come forward and claim rights in the property under the 
note and mortgage through a full chain of title.  Until that happens, 
however, the property has an uncertain encumbrance.  In conjunction with 
the costs of a quiet title suit or enhanced title insurance, we have 
impediments to the title that could render the property unmarketable.
121 
This creates a situation in which both the homeowner and the current 
purported mortgagee have some bargaining power over each other.  The 
mortgagee may want to foreclose or renegotiate the mortgage payments 
since it needs the money from the property to fulfill its capitalization 
requirements and to lessen any loss of profits from its investment in the 
property.  The homeowner needs to clear title so she can sell the property 
or get a new loan and to fix her credit rating.  They have an incentive to 
reach an agreement since both would like to clarify title.  But, of course, 
negotiations between them could fail for any number of reasons: they 
mistrust each other; they are mad at each other; they overestimate the other 
side’s reserve price.  And if the mortgage is held by a trust as part of a 
securitization, that trust may be subject to contractual limitations on its 
ability to renegotiate mortgages, while the thousands of investors in the 
securities have no ability to contact each other, much less agree on a course 
of action.
122  Moreover, even if the current mortgagee and mortgagor reach 
an agreement, under the law, the two of them cannot divest a prior 
mortgagee of any persisting interest in the property.  Remember that if we 
strictly enforce the statute of frauds, the current mortgagee who cannot 
show a full chain of mortgage assignments or who cannot prove that it is 
entitled to enforce the note owns nothing and the homeowner cannot free 
herself from an existing mortgage in someone else simply by saying so.  
An agreement between them would not discharge the rights of a prior 
                                                                                                                          
120 MERS’s website takes the contradictory positions that MERS is the “original mortgagee” and 
that it is the “agent” for the “owner of the loan” as well as the “mortgage lender.”  MERS FAQs, supra 
note 74.  This waffling in legal positions is part of what has confused the courts about MERS’s legal 
status. 
121 See Woolley & Herzog, supra note 85, at 367 (noting that MERS may make various titles 
unmarketable). 
122 Ro be r t C. H o cke tt, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for 
Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. 1, 6–7 (2013).  
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mortgagee. 
What to do?  The courts get around all this by allowing the current 
bank to file an affidavit swearing that it is the current lawful holder of the 
mortgage and the note, while public notice of foreclosure serves to place 
prior mortgagees on notice that they may lose their rights if they do not 
appear to assert them.
123  But once again, in an effort to save costs, some 
banks hired people to sign hundreds of affidavits a day.
124  They did so 
with no research whatsoever.
125  This “robo-signing” was not only a fraud 
on the court but it constituted perjury.
126  For this to work the way it is 
supposed to, the banks actually have to research each mortgage, find the 
note, and explain the evidence that leads the bank to believe that it actually 
has the right to foreclose on the property.
127  But if there is no clear chain 
of title and the note has been lost, what evidence would suffice?  By 
definition, we are only in this position because the written chain of 
evidence is broken or incomplete.  The affidavit constitutes a bank’s sworn 
statement, but it must be backed up by objective facts and evidence.  It is 
not clear the banks have sufficient ability to carry this out.  But if they do 
come up with reliable evidence and we allow them to claim the mortgage 
by an affidavit, we have fixed the title problem by relaxing the statute of 
frauds.  We are forgiving the bank for failing to comply with formality 
requirements, and we are doing so because strict adherence to formality 
would muddy property titles rather than clarify them. 
An alternative to relying on the mortgage assignments is to rely on the 
note as the basis for foreclosure.  Whoever possesses that note (or has a 
contract making it the agent of the note holder) arguably has the rights in 
the accompanying mortgage.  Traditionally, “the mortgage follows the 
note.”
128  The note is the primary legal obligation and the mortgage is 
simply a device to protect the interests of the note holder.
129  Traditionally, 
when the mortgage is assigned to another bank, the note should be 
                                                                                                                          
123 Gloria J. Liddell & Pearson Liddell, Jr., ROBO SIGNERS: The Legal Quagmire of Invalid 
Residential Foreclosure Proceedings and the Resultant Potential Impact upon Stakeholders, 16 CHAP. 
L. REV. 367, 378 (2012); White, supra note 22, at 479–80, 491–92. 
124 Liddell & Liddell, supra note 123, at 367–69; White, supra note 22, at 469–70. 
125 White, supra note 22, at 469–70. 
126 Liddell & Liddell, supra note 123, at 367–69. 
127 See White, supra note 22, at 472–73, 477 (noting that demonstrating possession of the physical 
note is the primary evidence of ownership and that the “touchstone of proper acquisition . . . is physical 
delivery of the original note”).  
128 Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Fequiere, 989 A.2d 606, 611 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); White, supra 
note 22, at 489; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4(c) (1996) (“A mortgage may 
be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage 
secures.”). 
129 SINGER, supra note 4, § 12.4.1.1, at 894.  
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endorsed and transferred along with it.
130  But what if that does not 
happen?  This was a common occurrence in the subprime mortgage 
market.  Some courts hold that the mortgage and the note cannot be owned 
by different parties.
131  But what happens if they are separated?  Other 
courts say that the note holder’s rights are primary and the mortgage holder 
holds those rights for the benefit of the note holder.
132  Still other courts 
say the holder of the mortgage owns it and along with it the rights under 
the note on the ground that a mortgage assignment intends to transfer rights 
in the note.
133  Some states hold that the foreclosing party must possess 
both the mortgage and the note or be in an agency relationship with the 
note holder.
134  Some states had clear rules about this prior to the subprime 
crisis but others did not.
135 
The prevailing view seems to be that most mortgage notes are 
negotiable instruments governed by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (U.C.C.) and that mortgage obligations are owed to the “person 
entitled to enforce the note” within the meaning of U.C.C. section 3-301; 
that person may be different from the person who “owns” the note and has 
                                                                                                                          
130 See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable; 
the former as essential, the latter as an incident.  An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, 
while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.”). 
131 E.g., Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (“[F]or there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just 
assignment of the deed alone; the note must also be assigned.” (citing Carpenter, 83 U.S. at 274)). 
132 See, e.g., Fequiere, 119 Conn. App. at 610–12 (noting that Connecticut General Statutes § 49-
17 “codifies the common-law principle of long standing that ‘the mortgage follows the note,’ pursuant 
to which only the rightful owner of the note has the right to enforce the mortgage”); Mortg. Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 838 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that a 
mortgage passed “as an incident to the promissory note” and therefore, the note holder had the right 
to foreclose).  Note also that a party may hold the note for the benefit of another party and act as an 
agent for that party, thus occupying a status as a person entitled to enforce the note although the 
proceeds of any such enforcement action belong to the principal who “owns” the note.  See BAC Home 
Loans Servicing, LP v. Kolenich, No. CA2012-01-001, 2012 WL 5306059, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 
29, 2012) (reasoning that the mortgage can be foreclosed by the holder of a negotiable note, even if the 
note is “owned” by a different party); Card, supra note 86, at 1651 (granting primary rights to the note 
holder under New York law). 
133 See, e.g., Crum v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 55 So.3d 266, 270 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that 
there was no “genuine issue of material fact that MERS assigned to the assignee all the rights formerly 
held by it and the lender”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 69 A.D.3d 204, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009) (“In order to commence a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must have a legal or equitable interest 
in the mortgage.”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 897 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) 
(holding that a bank without the right to foreclose “cannot cure its lack of standing by subsequently 
obtaining an interest in the mortgage”). 
134 See In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 254 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (analyzing the inconsistencies of 
assigning a mortgage when a party has no interest in the note); Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 
N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Mass. 2012) (discussing the fact that a foreclosure sale must comply with all 
applicable statutory provisions). 
135 On the complexity of the issues involved in determining the relation between the note and the 
mortgage, see Levitin, supra note 112, at 22 and Recent Case—U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez, 
941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2001), 125 HARV. L. REV. 827, 831–33 (2012).   
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the ultimate right to the economic value of the note.
136  To make things 
even more complicated, Article 9 of the U.C.C. was amended recently and 
its relationship to Article 3 has generated disputes among both practicing 
lawyers and scholars about the rules governing the transfer of notes issued 
to finance real property transactions.
137  Nor is the relationship clear 
between the U.C.C. and state recording and foreclosure statutes as to how 
to regulate the assignment of mortgages and rights in the note and the rules 
governing the evidence sufficient to start a foreclosure procedure.
138  The 
failure of the banks to assign MERS the role of holding the notes and 
ensuring their endorsement either in blank or with the series of mortgage 
transfers endorsed on them has created another, independent problem in 
clarifying who has the right to foreclose. 
The U.C.C. rules governing notes associated with mortgages were not 
clear at the time of the subprime mortgage debacle.
139  If law professors 
and experts in the field of real estate cannot agree on what the rules mean, 
then perhaps the banks could be forgiven for not knowing the law.
140  The 
architects of the Article 9 revisions thought that this would validate 
mortgage securitizations because Article 9 seems to recognize contracts 
that purport to transfer the beneficial interest in negotiable instruments but 
fail to adhere to the requirements of Article 3 that the notes be endorsed or 
the requirements of state mortgage law that may require mortgage 
assignments to be in writing and recorded before a foreclosure can 
occur.
141  In a sense then, the banks relied not on clear legal authority but 
on the assumption that the courts would roll over and protect the banks’ 
interests regardless of the legal uncertainties surrounding the transactions.  
They believed that, as in the past, the courts would assume that foreclosing 
entities had the right to foreclose and that defaulting homeowners deserved 
to lose their homes.  They assumed that multiple sources of legal authority 
                                                                                                                          
136 U.C.C. § 3-301 (2011); REPORT OF THE PERMANENT  EDITORIAL  BD. FOR THE UNIF. 
COMMERCIAL  CODE,  APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM  COMMERCIAL  CODE TO SELECTED  ISSUES 
RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES 4, 8 (2011), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/PEB%20Repo
rt%20-%20November%202011.pdf. 
137 Levitin, supra note 112, at 40; White, supra note 22, at 473; see also John Patrick Hunt, 
Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Rebalancing Public and Private in the Law of Mortgage Transfer 
10–11  (U.C. Davis Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 327, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117555 (analyzing the ambiguous relationship between Article 9 and state 
recording and foreclosure statutes).  But see Whitman, supra note 68, at 26 (positing that Article 9 
determines who owns the economic benefit of the note while Article 3 determines who has the power to 
enforce the note). 
138 See Levitin, supra note 112, at 22 (discussing the conflict of the U.C.C. Article 3 and state 
land record systems for recording a mortgage title); White, supra note 22, passim (recognizing that 
assignments in mortgages and notes followed different rules). 
139 Levitin, supra note 112, at 28; White, supra note 22, at 471–72. 
140  But see Levitin,  supra  note 112, at 40–41 (arguing that banks created this ambiguity by 
lobbying to amend Article 9 in a manner that made the rules unclear).  
141 Id. at 43.  
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would benefit them rather than muddy the waters. 
The opposite has turned out to be the case.  Because the banks 
diverged so sharply from prior practice by creating MERS, they took a risk 
that the courts would interpret state law to validate their arrangements.  
Their undoing stemmed from a lack of care in documenting mortgage 
transfers and keeping track of notes.  They did not anticipate that courts 
would both hold them to traditional statutory formality requirements and 
burdens of proof and rule in favor of homeowners and against the banks’ 
interests.  Because of the failures to clearly document mortgage 
assignments, keep clear custody of notes, and transfer them in proper ways, 
and because of the robo-signing scandal,
142 many judges no longer trust the 
banks. 
The old system worked because the courts trusted the banks, and now 
that that trust is gone, we are beset by dilemmas.  The banks did not realize 
that an efficient and well-working market system depends on trust, both 
among market actors and contracting parties and between market actors 
and government regulators, including judges.  The banks cut corners and 
many judges today are in no mood to cut them slack.  To make matters 
worse, many states allow nonjudicial foreclosure—a much less expensive 
system than judicial foreclosure
143—which is especially dependent on 
courts’ and legislators’ trust in banks to exercise their powers 
appropriately.  But now that trust in banks has been shattered, eviction 
lawsuits following nonjudicial foreclosure are reintroducing the costs that 
nonjudicial foreclosure was supposed to avoid. 
Amazingly, over the last ten years, the banks have wrecked a property 
recording system that worked relatively well for hundreds of years.
144  It is 
astonishing that they did this and tragic that we are suffering the price of 
their arrogance.  We are left today with clouded titles, rampant litigation, 
and insecure property rights.  All of this inhibits the use and alienability of 
land.  The banks’ practices violated core norms underlying private property 
law.
145  The banks thought they could make money by getting around the 
rules or even by ignoring them.  We had clear rules, but the banks ignored 
them.  Clear rules did not lead to either clear titles or predictable results. 
That leaves us with a paradox.  If we do not have a writing requirement 
for property transactions, then property rights will not be clear; people can 
                                                                                                                          
142 Id. at 1, 6.  
143 Id. at 21.  
144 For a detailed explanation of various title problems MERS created, see Woolley & Herzog, 
supra note 85, at 382–83. 
145 See Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic 
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1023 (2009) (acknowledging that traditional core of property law is 
the promotion of alienability); Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1371 (2013) [hereinafter Singer, Rule of Reason in Property Law] (noting that 
property law aims to achieve clear titles).   
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always claim they acquired rights by informal arrangements or oral 
contracts and it is easy to lie about such things.  But if we strictly enforce 
the writing requirement, title will also not be clear; because of the massive 
refusal to comply with the writing requirement and because of the 
importance of mortgages to the banks’ capital structure and bottom line, 
strict enforcement of the writing requirement will either cause a new 
recession or generate massive lawsuits to renegotiate property rights.   
We’re damned if we do and damned if we don’t.  Rigid rules, including 
rules governing formalities, do not necessarily lead to clear property rights 
even if you attempt to apply them mechanically.  Rules do not promote 
predictability or clear property rights if people do not follow them; this 
turns out to be a far more serious problem that we may have thought. 
C.  Privatization of Public Land Records 
The MERS system failed not only because it led to careless record 
keeping and was carried out in a manner that violated the real property law 
of many states, but because it privatized information about mortgages.
146  
State recording acts generally promote but do not require interests in real 
property to be recorded to be valid.
147  A few states, like Pennsylvania, do 
require that real property interests be in writing, and also recorded, to be 
legally valid.
148  Most states rely on the self-interest of mortgage lenders to 
record mortgages to ensure that they have priority over later interests.  The 
system not only promotes a clear record of who owns property and what 
encumbrances attach to it, but makes that information available to the 
general public.  This means that anyone who wants to buy property or 
provide a loan secured by a mortgage in the property can determine who 
owns the property and what prior liens exist on it.  Making the information 
public serves the old-fashioned goals of property law by promoting the 
alienability of land.  While mortgage assignments were not always 
recorded before the subprime crisis, MERS complicated things enormously 
by seeking to occupy an ambiguous status in the mortgage system and by 
inducing privatization of mortgage information. 
Because only MERS’s name and that of the original lender appear in 
                                                                                                                          
146 See Levitin, supra note 112, at 30 (describing the “MERS’ database functions as a do-it 
yourself private mortgage recordation system”). 
147 Whitman, supra note 68, at 51. 
148 See Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444–45 (E.D. Pa. 2012) 
(interpreting a Pennsylvania statute, 21 PA. CONS. STAT. § 351 (2011), to require recording for transfers 
of interests in land to be valid); cf. Hooker v. N.W. Tr. Servs., No. 10-3111-PA, 2011 WL 2119103, at 
*3 (D. Or. May 25, 2011) (interpreting OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735 (2010) to conclude that nonjudicial 
foreclosure is not available in Oregon unless all mortgage assignments are recorded); PHH Mortg. 
Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 200 P.3d 1180, 1186 (Idaho 2009) (interpreting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505 
(2008) and holding that a trustee cannot foreclose on a trust deed unless the trust deed and any of its 
assignments are recorded).   
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the public records, publicly available information about who owns 
particular mortgages no longer exists; that information is all on MERS’s 
private computers.
149  Until recently, MERS did not even make that 
information available to the homeowners who were obligated to pay the 
mortgages; all MERS would tell homeowners was the name of the loan 
servicer hired to collect their payments.
150  For that reason, the homeowner 
who wanted to avoid foreclosure by negotiating with the beneficial owner 
of the mortgage could not find out who that was by searching either public 
records or by consulting MERS.
151  MERS has now partially changed that 
policy, but it still does not make mortgage ownership information available 
to the public; it will not tell strangers who owns the mortgage in a 
particular piece of real estate.
152  Nor will MERS reveal the chain of title so 
potential buyers of land can determine if the current mortgage holder could 
foreclose on the property if it sought to do so. 
What effects does this new secrecy of property titles have?  For one 
thing, homeowners seeking to renegotiate their mortgages could not do so 
when MERS would not tell them who owned the mortgage.  MERS would 
only tell them the name of the loan servicer and loan servicers often had 
incentives to foreclose rather than renegotiate.
153  The loan servicers’ 
contracts often gave them more money that way and sometimes the 
contracts prohibited them from renegotiating the deal.
154  But even though 
MERS has changed that policy, neither the homeowner nor others can 
determine what encumbrances exist on the property.  Because of past 
business practices by MERS and the banks, neither homeowners, potential 
buyers, the banks, nor the courts have any reason to treat MERS records as 
                                                                                                                          
149 MERS’s website misleadingly asserts that it does not “hide the mortgage note owner” because 
all MERS mortgages “are recorded in the public land records” while acknowledging that the purpose of 
the MERS system is to make it unnecessary for lenders to record mortgage assignments.  MERS FAQs, 
supra note 74.  “Because MERS is a common agent for its members, recording an assignment of the 
mortgage is not necessary when ownership of the promissory note or servicing rights transfer between 
members.”  Id.; see also Peterson, supra note 25, at 1400–04 (noting the negative effect of MERS on 
public land title records). 
150 Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording System, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 23 (2011). 
151 Robinson, supra note 21, at 1638. 
152  See Marsh, supra  note 150, at 23 (describing how when a mortgage is sold and “the 
conveyance information is registered in MERS, but no assignment is recorded,” it is difficult to tell 
who actually owns the mortgage); see also Complaint at ¶ 150(b), Mass. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 11-
4363-BLS1, 2012 WL 6062747 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2011) (noting that when a promissory note is 
sold, the transaction is supposed to be tracked in the MERS database, but MERS members are 
responsible for entering information into the system, and only these members can access this 
information).  
153 Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE  J. ON REG.  1, 4  (2011) 
(analyzing the servicing industry and how the economics of the industry often discourage the 
restructuring of defaulted loans). 
154 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 131; White, supra note 22, at 496.  
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either complete or accurate.  And since they cannot trust those records, 
they seek information about the actual chain of transactions affecting the 
property.  But MERS treats its computers and the information on it as 
private property from which it has the right to exclude outsiders.  The 
result of all this has been to destroy our public recording system.  We no 
longer have trustworthy public records of property title in the United 
States. 
Property scholars have long argued that property rights cannot work if 
they are not clear.
155  They have also recently emphasized that they cannot 
work if they are not publicly known.  Henry Smith’s work on the in rem 
nature of property rights emphasizes the information cost benefits of 
knowing who the gate keeper for property is.
156  Privatizing information in 
property rights requires us to trust MERS to accurately determine who the 
current mortgagee is.  But we have no reason to trust MERS because the 
records are not public and because the MERS system induced banks to 
keep incomplete and inaccurate records of mortgage assignments.   
Moreover, monopolies have a tendency to abuse their power unless they 
are subject to oversight. 
While freedom of contract is traditionally assumed to be the core value 
of our contract law system, promoting the alienability of land is 
traditionally assumed to be the core value of our property law system.
157  
That policy supports giving owners robust powers over their property and 
it requires clear rules about who owns what—meaning public notice of 
who owns land and how it is encumbered.  In their zeal to make money, 
the banks have broken the foundational structures on which our property 
law system sat.  They viewed regulations as costly interferences with their 
pursuit of profit and they failed to understand how those regulations were 
necessary for the property market to work well in the first place. 
III.  HOW TO FIX THEM 
How should courts respond to the problems the subprime market has 
presented to them?  What laws should legislatures pass to avoid these 
                                                                                                                          
155  See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three 
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1022 (2008) (“There cannot be ownership in land without some 
clear idea of who owns the land, what land is owned, and what rights accrue to the owner as a result of 
her status.”);  Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking Our Own 
Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345, 352 (2006) (“Individuals working to grow their assets must be supported 
by clear laws defining their property rights . . . .”). 
156 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion v. Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454–55 (2002); see Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1719, 1797 (2004) (“Property rules have informational advantages.”).   
157 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1710–11 (2012) 
(discussing how the exclusion strategy and a modest governance strategy help facilitate the alienability 
of property).  
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problems in the future?  Answering these questions requires us not only to 
identify broad normative principles for mortgage law and policy but to 
consider the various options that might best deal with both current 
litigation and future transactions.  To that end, it will help to identify the 
basic institutional design principles that should guide fair mortgage 
markets. 
Section A below identifies two basic normative principles for 
mortgage law.  First, protect consumers.  Second, create a secure legal 
infrastructure for property.  The consumer protection norm means that we 
must protect potential and existing homeowners from unfair and deceptive 
practices in the mortgage market.  We must also protect them—and the rest 
of us—from unreasonable systemic risk.  The legal infrastructure norm 
means that we must ensure that property titles are both clear and public and 
that the processes by which mortgages are sold, transferred, and securitized 
work smoothly and enable the market to continue into the future.
158  
Section B below develops the implications of these norms for how 
courts should handle foreclosure cases currently in the pipeline and for 
how legislatures and regulators should reform mortgage laws to create a 
secure legal infrastructure for the future. 
A.  Institutional Design Principles 
1.  Consumer Protection 
The subprime crisis could have been avoided (or mitigated) if the 
banks had not saddled homeowners with unaffordable loans and if the 
government had promoted homeownership through viable and appropriate 
means rather than deregulation and promotion of subprime mortgages.   
This suggests that a fundamental principle guiding a just and efficient 
property system is the protection of consumers from unfair or deceptive 
practices.
159  Indeed, every state has a consumer protection statute that 
prohibits such business practices.
160  The Federal Trade Commission Act 
similarly prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
                                                                                                                          
158 See Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 39 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (“First, the 
nonjudicial foreclosure process should remain efficient and inexpensive.  Second, the process should 
provide an adequate opportunity for interested parties to prevent wrongful foreclosure.  Third, the 
process should promote the stability of land titles.”); see also Mortg. Fin. Working Grp., Building a 
New Infrastructure for the Secondary Mortgage Market, CTR. FOR AM.  PROGRESS                            
(Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/news/2012/12/05/47073/building-a-
new-infrastructure-for-the-secondary-mortgage-market/ (identifying principles for the mortgage market 
that center on liquidity, stability, transparency and standardization, affordability and access, and 
consumer protection). 
159 See Peterson, note 20, at 2190 (noting that existing consumer protection has been rendered 
obsolete and arguing that the law must be updated using limited assignee liability and imputed liability 
theories to address the problems associated with predatory lending and finance). 
160 See Singer, supra note 52, at 155 n.45 (listing state consumer protection statutes).  
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commerce.”
161  Consumer protection law not only promotes the values of 
treating people with respect and dignity but provides a useful barrier 
against schemes that can spin out of control and undermine the 
infrastructure of the economic system.  Unfair or deceptive property 
transactions effectively defraud consumers out of their hard-earned wealth 
and make them worse off than before while causing enormous negative 
externalities that have the potential to undermine the world economy.  We 
protect consumers from unjust business practices (1) to protect them from 
fraud and deception, (2) to protect them from unfair arrangements, and (3) 
to protect innocent third parties from undue systemic risk. 
First, deceptive practices induce people to enter agreements they 
would not make if they had adequate information.  They are a species of 
fraud and the opposite of the freedom of contract.
162  We are free to make 
contracts with others, but we are also free not to make contracts.   
Agreements make both parties better off than they were before the 
agreement because each is getting something they want and giving up 
something they are willing to exchange for what they get.  Deception in the 
contracting process induces agreements that are not in the best interests of 
both parties.  Both fraud (lying about a material fact to induce agreement) 
and deception (making misleading statements or failing to reveal 
information the other side would want to know) undermine any sense that 
contract enforcement promotes the will or the interests of both parties.   
They are akin to diverting someone’s attention so you can pick his pocket.  
For that reason, deception is a form of theft.  It not only contravenes 
freedom of contract norms but violates the property rights of the victim. 
There was a lot of deception in the subprime mortgage market.   
Borrowers were often misled about the interest rates they would be 
paying.
163  Even educated borrowers were commonly surprised by sudden 
rises in mortgage payments.  This happened because the mortgage 
documents were so complicated and the mortgage brokers failed to clearly 
explain what the borrowers were getting into.  If the borrowers had clearly 
understood what the real interest rate was, some would not have agreed to 
the loan at all.  As Federal Reserve Board Governor Ned Gramlich noted, 
“Why are the most risky loan products sold to the least sophisticated 
borrowers?  The question answers itself—the least sophisticated borrowers 
are probably duped into taking these products.”
164  Mortgage brokers who 
did explain the intricacies of adjustable rate mortgages probably assured 
                                                                                                                          
161 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
162 See Peterson, supra note 20, at 2229 (explaining that in some states deceptive lending practices 
are governed by the law of fraud). 
163 Stan Liebowitz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2009, at A13. 
164 Edward M. Gramlich, Booms and Busts: The Case of Subprime Mortgages, FED. RES. BANK 
KANS. CITY: ECON. REV., 4th Quarter 2007, at 105, 110.  
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borrowers that they could refinance when the interest rates increased.   
They probably did not explain, however, that this ability to refinance 
would disappear if housing prices stalled or plummeted.  They induced 
borrowers to ignore such real concerns.  Similarly, banks misled investors 
in securitized mortgages by giving AAA ratings to subprime mortgages 
held by people who could not afford to pay them back if housing prices 
decreased.
165 
Subprime mortgage marketing rested on mixed messages.  Subprime 
borrowers were told that they had to pay high interest rates because they 
posed a high credit risk, but they were then told they would never have to 
pay those high, unaffordable rates because they could refinance.
166  They 
were not told or did not understand that this would only work if property 
values continued to rise forever—something that had never happened 
before in human history.  Similarly, investors in mortgage-backed 
securities were told that they paid high returns because subprime loans 
were so risky, but then the bankers arranged for them to have AAA ratings, 
suggesting that they posed no risk at all.
167  High return, low risk.  This 
message was too good to be true.  The consumers and investors relied on 
the bankers’ reassurances that the loans were suited to subprime borrowers 
and safe for risk-averse investors.  The banks took advantage of mixed 
messages because they knew that their customers would trust them.  Mixed 
messages are deceptive because they are designed to induce people to hear 
the bad news and then ignore it.  They are designed to promote trust while 
violating it. 
We could of course debate how much deception there was or what 
forms of market practice are acceptable.  One could argue that borrowers 
and investors made free choices to invest in risky purchases, made high 
returns for taking those risks, and voluntarily took on the risk.  If all this is 
true, borrowers and investors have no one to blame but themselves for their 
misfortune.  They assumed the risk and we have no good reason to depart 
from the traditional doctrine of caveat emptor.  This argument has merit for 
some consumers and some transactions, but it does require distinguishing 
between acceptable and unacceptable business practices.  The law not only 
prohibits outright fraud; it also prohibits “deceptive . . . practices.”
168  The 
                                                                                                                          
165 Floyd Norris, Grumbles Follow Plan to Raise Bank Capital, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2013, at B1. 
166 A l e x  M .  J o h n s o n ,  J r . ,  Preventing a Return Engagement: Eliminating the Mortgage 
Purchasers’ Status as a Holder-in-Due-Course: Properly Aligning Incentives Among the Parties, 37 
PEPP. L. REV. 529, 563 (2010). 
167 See Jeffrey Friedman, Bank Pay and the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2009, at A21 
(describing a study that found eighty-one percent of mortgage-backed securities were given AAA 
ratings); Richard H. Thaler, Underwater, but Will They Leave the Pool?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, 
BU3 (noting that investors bought mortgage-backed securities because they wanted to gain high 
returns). 
168 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).  
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federal securities laws that protect shareholders who invest in stocks 
prohibit not only misleading statements, but also omissions that convey a 
false impression about facts investors would want to know in deciding 
whether to invest in a company’s stock.
169  One could argue for repealing 
state consumer protection laws and federal trade and securities regulations, 
but the truth is that both consumers and sophisticated investors want 
protection from deceptive practices.  These laws do not interfere with 
freedom of contact; rather, they ensure that people get what they want 
when they buy or invest.
170  In so doing, they also protect private property 
by ensuring that businesses cannot take your money on false or misleading 
pretenses. 
Second, in addition to preventing fraud or deception, consumer 
protection laws promote fairness in market transactions.  Or at least they 
prohibit “unfair” transactions.
171  This principle protects consumers and 
requires businesses to treat customers with dignity.  While the prohibition 
on deception focuses on giving the consumer what she wants, fairness 
requires more than this; it holds businesses to minimum standards in 
market relationships to protect the justified expectations of those with 
whom they do business. 
Scholars often worry about minimum wage and other regulatory laws 
because they increase the costs of doing business and hurt those at the 
bottom of the economic ladder.
172  While it is true that regulations increase 
the costs of providing consumer goods and services, we do not help the 
poor by eliminating regulations that the rest of us need.  We could lower 
the costs of housing by eliminating all building code regulations and 
allowing people to live in shacks.  This would decrease the costs of 
housing but would deprive everyone of the security of living in safe 
housing.  Instead, we ensure that market transactions provide consumers 
with what they have a right to expect and we protect the poor in ways other 
than removing regulations that protect the rest of us. 
Legislation that articulates these minimum standards not only ensures 
                                                                                                                          
169 See Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (stating that it is unlawful to use any 
“manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the sale of any security); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013) (stating that it is unlawful, in connection with the sale of any security, to 
“defraud” or “to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading . . . .”). 
170 Singer, supra note 52, at 157. 
171  See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (prohibiting “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce”). 
172  See  Harry Hutchinson, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage 
Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93, 109 (1997) 
(explaining the theory behind how a minimum wage regulation could increase the cost of business 
because employers have to pay employees at higher rates, and as a result, employers may choose to lay 
off existing workers thus leaving many low skilled workers without employment).   
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that people get what they want out of market transactions, but that people 
are treated with minimum levels of respect.  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts held that it constitutes an “unfair 
practice” in violation of the state’s consumer protection statute to grant a 
mortgage to a borrower who cannot pay it back if it is structured in a 
manner that would make it impossible to refinance if housing values fell.
173  
This is at least true when it is clear that housing values are starting to level 
off or fall.  In such a case, it is not true that it is better to have owned and 
lost than never to have owned at all—and the bank knows it.
174  Selling a 
loan to such a buyer is the moral equivalent of picking the consumer’s 
pocket. 
Consumers are not making a mistake when they trust businesses to 
treat them fairly.  They are entitled to believe that businesses like banks 
know what they are doing and that the products they sell will operate as 
advertised.  Trusting customers are doing nothing wrong.  The banks that 
take advantage of mixed messages or that sell products designed to 
impoverish the customer are not engaged in free commerce; they are 
manipulating consumers to strip them of their wealth.  We have consumer 
protection laws not because people are stupid or foolish; we have such 
laws because pressures to pursue profits can induce businesses to sell what 
they should not sell.  In such cases, it is the sellers, not the buyers, who are 
morally responsible for unfair outcomes.  We do not, after all, blame 
people when thieves pick their pockets; we do not say “shame on you for 
carrying money around on your person.”  No, we blame the thief. 
Banks understandably may wish to be free of vague obligations to 
consumers and investors.  They want clear rules and the power to “walk 
the line” offering products and services as long as they are not clearly 
prohibited.  While we need some clear rules to outlaw the worst practices, 
we also need banks to realize that those laws do not immunize them from 
regulation of unfair and deceptive practices.  We want banks to imagine 
whether they can convince a judge or a jury that their conduct was lawful 
and appropriate. 
To achieve these goals, we may need to abolish or modify the holder-
in-due-course doctrine that immunizes note holders from fraud claims 
based on acts by note originators.
175  That doctrine promotes negotiability 
of loans while also promoting fraud; several scholars have argued to 
                                                                                                                          
173 Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 558–59 (Mass. 2008); Joseph 
William Singer, Property Law as the Infrastructure of Democracy: The Fourth in the Wolf Family 
Lecture Series on the American Law of Real Property, in 11 POWELL ON REAL PROP., Part V, at 
WFL11-1, 11-14 to 11-15 (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2013); Singer, supra note 52, at 159. 
174 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 41 (“Without a doubt, most borrowers with subprime loans 
would have been better off with loans on better terms or with no loans at all.”). 
175 Id. at 235.  
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extend the FTC “holder-notice rule” to home mortgages so as to preserve 
consumer claims and defenses when notes are transferred.
176  Such a law 
reform will not hamper negotiability as long as banks refrain from 
deceptive practices—something they should be doing anyway.  Indeed, the 
holder-in-due-course doctrine does not protect the transferee of a note 
where there is “fraud in the factum.”
177  This exists where the signer does 
not know the “character” or “essential terms” of the instrument and 
“lack[s] a reasonable opportunity to obtain this knowledge.”
178  In other 
words, the fraud induces the consumer to sign the agreement.  Fraud in the 
factum may exist where oral representations are made that diverge from 
the written terms of the agreement and the signer reasonably relied on 
those oral representations, something that was common in subprime 
mortgage transactions.
179 
Third, the sale of loans to people who could not pay them back and of 
mortgage-backed securities to investors who thought they were AAA safe 
had the side effect of causing a worldwide recession in 2008, the effects of 
which are still much in evidence now in 2013.  The third party effects were 
both enormous and unfair.  Banks made money in a manner that imposed 
undeserved losses on innocent third parties, resulting from millions of 
foreclosures combined with a stalled housing market and a depressed 
economy.  Those losses included lost jobs, diminished pension and college 
funds, lower stock prices, depressed public services, and lower property 
values.
180  Even if one believes that subprime borrowers got what was 
coming to them, innocent third parties had no part in causing the harms 
they suffered. 
We must protect people from avoidable losses associated with conduct 
that creates unreasonable systemic risk.  Never again will it be difficult for 
me to explain to my property law students why we regulate the packages of 
                                                                                                                          
176 Peterson, supra note 20, at 2257, 2274; see ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 5, at 235 (arguing 
that the holder-in-due-course doctrine has unfair consequences for borrowers and should be 
eliminated); Johnson, supra  note 166, at 536 (advocating for eliminating the holder-in-due-course 
doctrine to provide incentives to parties and reform the existing residential mortgage market); see also 
16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2013) (preserving consumer claims and defenses by requiring all consumer credit 
contracts to state, “ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO 
ALL  CLAIMS  AND  DEFENSES . . . .”);  JAMES  J.  WHITE,  ROBERT  S.  SUMMERS  &  ROBERT  A. 
HILLMAN, 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18:1, at 223–24 (6th ed. 2013) (noting that the FTC 
abolished the holder-in-due-course doctrine for most consumer credit transactions).  Contrary to some 
fears, this has not substantially restricted the flow of credit to consumers.  The FTC rule does not 
extend to mortgage transactions.  Id. § 18:26, at 281–85. 
177 U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 1 (2011). 
178 WHITE ET AL., supra note 176, § 18:31, at 295–97.  
179 U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 1. 
180 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates 
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 967 (2009) (noting that 
stocks in the U.S. fell by $10 trillion from October 2007 to February 2009, and that 4.4 million 
Americans lost their jobs).  
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property rights you are allowed to create.  All I have to do is utter the 
words “subprime crisis” to remind them that property rights impose 
externalities on others and some of those externalities have the potential to 
go so far as to wreck the world economy.  We need to set minimum 
standards for market transactions, not only to ensure that people are treated 
fairly, but to protect the general public from the negative effects of unduly 
risky schemes.  
Now that the banks have become landlords and neighbors by taking 
properties in foreclosure and keeping them until they can be profitably 
resold on the market, they cannot complain when they find that they are 
subject to the same rules as other landlords.  They may have skirted the 
statute of frauds, the recording acts, and the foreclosure laws, but that does 
not mean they are entitled to ignore housing codes, zoning laws, or 
landlord-tenant law.  Both tenants and neighbors have a right to be treated 
with human dignity and that entails compliance with minimum standards 
for housing and real estate construction and maintenance.  If you want your 
neighbors to maintain their houses so that neighborhood values are 
preserved, you cannot claim a right to violate those regulations yourself. 
2.  A Secure Legal Infrastructure for Property 
The subprime disaster has taught us a valuable lesson about the 
institution of private property.  Property cannot work without regulation.  
Since another name for “regulation” is the “rule of law,” we can say that 
the infrastructure of our property system includes laws establishing and 
clarifying property rights.  While those rules impose costs on market 
actors, property cannot exist without them.  And the benefits of the 
institution of private property outweigh its costs.  
The banks wanted to reduce the costs of formalizing and recording 
mortgages.  There is nothing wrong with the impetus to reduce costs and 
improve efficiencies.  New technology has allowed faster, cheaper ways of 
disaggregating, formalizing, and exchanging property rights, and the 
mortgage industry was right to take advantage of it.  But the mortgage 
industry was entranced by the technology and by the idea of cost reduction 
and assumed that things that could be done should b e  d o n e .   B y  
establishing MERS, they went gangbusters into new technological and 
institutional frameworks for mortgage law without adequate consideration 
for whether they were complying with existing real property law rules or 
what the effects might be on the infrastructure of property.  They assumed 
that costs to them were costs to society; they did not understand that the 
benefits associated with property law rules might outweigh their costs, not 
only to society but to the banks themselves. 
We need to ensure that owners have clear title to their property.   
Without such clarity, they can neither use their property nor sell it.  To 
ensure clear title we have ancient rules that require real estate transactions,  
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including mortgages, to be reduced to a clear writing and publicly 
recorded.  Such rules protect homeowners by enabling them to use and sell 
their property; they also promote purchase by ensuring buyers they will get 
what they think they are purchasing.  The formality and publicity rules 
skirted by the banks are not archaic relics of a primitive society; they are 
the foundation of our property system and can be avoided only when doing 
so is necessary to avoid systemic risk or substantial injustice.  The banks 
must learn from the past as well as the lawsuits complaining of 
misrepresentation, robo-signing, and sloppy record keeping.
181 
The banks also forgot that while securities markets are global, property 
law is (mostly) local.  It is not clear that the banks sought or received high 
quality advice from real estate lawyers about the legality of MERS or its 
practices.  The banks’ failure to assess correctly state property law rules 
designed to protect homeowners and ensure clear title—or to understand 
their purpose and importance—has meant that the banks’ technological and 
institutional innovations have not only failed to achieve their purposes but 
have had potentially devastating consequences on the security, alienability, 
and publicity of land titles in the United States.  The mess they have left us 
with suggests either that we renew compliance with traditional legal forms 
and principles or that we figure out how to modify those forms to take 
advantage of new technologies while preserving the benefits of traditional 
regulations. 
Some Americans instinctively see government regulation as an 
interference with our freedom.  This value underlies the norm of freedom 
of contract and it can blind us to the benefits of the rule of law, otherwise 
known as “regulation.”  We cherish the freedom to use markets to redefine 
and exchange new forms of property, through securitization or other 
means.  At the same time, we must not forget that neither markets nor 
property can exist without a legal framework.  We have legal rules 
governing the creation, transfer, recording, and enforcement of property 
rights because without these rules, property cannot exist as an institution.  
Neither the statute of frauds nor state recording acts are pointless 
technicalities or regulatory impediments to freedom or efficiency.  Rather, 
                                                                                                                          
181  See Chris Isidore, Bank of America Sued for Alleged Mortgage Fraud,                     
CNNMONEY (Oct. 25, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/24/news/companies/bank-of-america-
lawsuit/index.html (describing the alleged fraud of Bank of America in its mortgaging scheme); Silver-
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they are part of the infrastructure that allows property to exist.  Rules that 
clarify title and protect the core rights of owners are the foundation on 
which markets operate. 
B.  Protecting Consumers 
1.  By Disclosure and Qualification 
Banks should protect consumers from unduly burdensome mortgages 
by not granting mortgages to people who cannot pay them back.  This is so 
obvious now that banks are refraining from giving mortgages to people 
who cannot pay them back.
182  One way to achieve this goal is to enact 
better disclosure requirements, so that borrowers understand what they are 
committing themselves to when they take out a loan.
183  Luckily, the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) will enact regulations of 
this sort.
184 
At the same time, better disclosure requirements will not completely 
solve the problem.
185  It is sometimes thought that all we have to do is 
ensure that consumers have proper information and then let them make 
whatever decisions they want to make on the ground that stopping them 
from doing so constitutes inappropriate paternalistic interference with their 
autonomy.
186  It is sometimes thought, on the other hand, that we need 
regulation of consumer contracts because consumers are either not smart 
enough to understand the contracts they are signing or that they are 
irrational and psychologically incapable of appreciating the real risks 
involved in the arrangement.
187 
In truth, we regulate consumer contracts not because consumers are 
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187 See Bar-Gill, supra note 183, at 1075 (“[T]he problem is that lenders hid these high prices and 
borrowers underappreciated them.”); id. at 1079 (“Myopic borrowers unduly focus on the short-term 
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stupid or irrational but because sellers are too easily drawn in to money-
making schemes that cannot be defended from a moral point of view.   
Banks are in the business of lending money to people who need it and can 
pay it back with reasonable security from assets they own.  Banks should 
not lend to those who cannot pay back the loan because they should not be 
in the business of selling mortgages for the sole purpose of stripping the 
owner’s equity from the home.
188  As Joseph Stiglitz explained: “There 
was no point of putting someone in a home for a few months and then 
tossing him out after having stripped him of his life savings.  But that was 
what the banks were doing.”
189  We have consumer protection statutes that 
prohibit unfair or deceptive practices not because consumers are irrational 
but to ensure that businesses treat their customers like customers rather 
than marks who can be easily parted from their wallets.  Consumer 
protection laws are not paternalistic interferences with freedom of contract; 
they protect the property rights of consumers. 
Banks and mortgage brokers need to develop a better appreciation that 
they are not legally entitled to defraud or mislead borrowers about the 
transactions they are entering.  Nor are they entitled to hook borrowers into 
arrangements that they are very likely to regret.  The subprime crisis has, 
to some extent, brought banks to their senses.  The old-fashioned practice 
of determining whether someone qualifies for a mortgage has returned.  
The trauma associated with the subprime crisis might have led us to 
imagine that no new regulations might be needed to go back to this 
practice.  At the same time, history shows that the temptation to bleed the 
vulnerable may require appropriate regulations at either the federal or state 
level to ensure that people who cannot afford mortgages are steered to 
obtaining housing in other, more appropriate ways. 
Recent applications of consumer protection and securities regulation 
laws are a step in this direction.
190  Their injunction to avoid “unfair” as 
well as “deceptive” practices goes beyond common law fraud and puts 
banks on notice that they neither have—nor are entitled to—a safe harbor 
when they sell products they cannot defend to a judge or jury.  Importantly, 
the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, passed as 
one part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act,  makes ability to repay a condition for granting a residential 
mortgage.
191  Final regulations have now been issued that prevent granting 
                                                                                                                          
188 Braucher, supra note 185, at 119 (“The essence of predatory lending is extending credit to 
those who can be expected to default, and creditors who fail to evaluate creditworthiness know that 
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ECONOMY 11 (2010). 
190 See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 556–61 (Mass. 2008) (stating 
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191 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1631 (2012).  
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high-priced mortgages to those who cannot afford them and provide 
presumptive protection for “qualified mortgages” that meet certain 
affordability criteria.
192  These regulations are not perfect but they are a 
very welcome step.  At the same time, those regulations leave in place state 
and federal laws that prohibit “unfair and deceptive practices” in the 
mortgage industry. 
2.  By Safeguarding the Homeowner’s Equity 
We should remember that the historical origin of mortgage regulation 
was designed to achieve the dual goals of ensuring repayment of the loan 
while protecting the homeowner’s equity.  The abolition of strict 
foreclosure ensured that the lender got back its loan with agreed-upon 
interest upon foreclosure but that any excess value in the real property, 
e.g., the “equity,” belonged to the homeowner.
193  This homeowner equity 
principle takes a back seat in times like ours when property values have 
plummeted and we are beset by “underwater” mortgages that exceed the 
current value of the mortgaged property.  At the same time, homeowner 
protection underlies the multiple efforts over the last five years to limit 
foreclosures by both federal and state officials.
194 
One way we can protect the equity of homeowners in a time of 
decreasing property values is by ensuring that foreclosures only occur 
when they are the best way to protect the banks’ financial interest in 
recouping their loans.  Many banks adopted general policies not to 
negotiate with homeowners to extend the term of the loan or to change the 
payment schedule;
195 they assumed that such a blanket policy would save 
the transaction costs of evaluating the loans on a case-by-case basis and 
allow them to clear their books of bad loans.  There are many barriers to 
renegotiation beyond transaction costs—such as incentive structures for 
loan servicers and the terms of the contracts associated with the loan 
                                                                                                                          
192  See  12 C.F.R. pt. 1026 (2013) (amending Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in 
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195 Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis, 11 
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servicer and securitization—that discourage loan modification.
196  
In some instances, renegotiation of the loan repayment terms would be 
economically better than foreclosure for both the lender and the borrower 
(as well as the investors).
197  The principle of protecting the homeowner’s 
equity, as well as avoiding the individual and social harms caused by 
widespread displacement from one’s home, is part of what accounts for the 
various state laws requiring mediation between the bank and the 
homeowner before foreclosure can occur.
198  A new Massachusetts law 
requires lenders to compare the anticipated net recovery from foreclosure 
with what they would receive from a mortgage modification to payment 
levels the borrower can afford.
199  The 2009 federal Home Affordable 
Mortgage Program (HAMP) created incentives for banks to modify loans 
for borrowers who were paying more than thirty-one percent of their 
income toward housing costs when modification was economically more 
advantageous than foreclosure to the lender.
200  Banks may view these laws 
as increasing their cost of doing business but they are intended to promote 
payment modifications only when it benefits both the borrower and the 
lender. 
A second way to protect homeowner equity is to ensure that 
foreclosures only occur when the foreclosing party can prove its legal right 
to foreclose.  Courts have begun to insist on better proof that the 
foreclosing bank actually owns the mortgage encumbering the property.
201  
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Richard H. Martin, Proving Standing to Foreclose a Florida Mortgage, 85 FLA. B.J. 31, 31 (2011) 
(stating the Florida judiciary’s requirement that “the [bank] must usually show, through admissible 
evidence, that it holds the note and mortgage” in order to prove standing).  
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They have done so by renewed insistence on the formalities that give the 
best evidence of title.
202  The banks have lost the trust of many courts by 
failing to adequately formalize mortgage transfers and by adopting the 
MERS system that privatizes this information.  Banks argue that 
formalities are technicalities;
203 they effectively seek to reverse the burden 
of proof, allowing foreclosures to happen unless homeowners can prove 
the bank is not the current mortgage holder.
204  But the loss of trust in the 
title system has led some courts to insist on a showing of chain of title of 
mortgage assignments.
205 
Even if the banks cannot make this showing, they at least should be 
able to present enough evidence to show why they believe they are the 
lawful, current assignee of mortgage rights in the property.  The records 
may be incomplete; they may not satisfy the statute of frauds.  But the 
evidence must show, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
bank is the current lawful assignee of the original mortgage.  A bank that 
cannot make this showing has no right to foreclose.  We protect the 
homeowner’s equity, not just because it represents wealth, but because of 
the harmful consequences of displacing a family from its home.
206  In 
judicial foreclosure states, this means that the foreclosure process has 
heightened (or restored) the burden of proof on the foreclosing bank to 
prove its legal rights by written evidence sufficient to satisfy the statute of 
frauds.
207  In the majority of states that allow nonjudicial foreclosure, it 
means that homeowners may be able to resist eviction after foreclosure if 
the foreclosing bank cannot satisfy the court that it had the legal right to 
foreclose.
208  This possibility may allow borrowers to force banks to 
negotiate for loan modifications before foreclosure.  While all this may 
                                                                                                                          
202 See Dana, supra note 22, at 514–15 (explaining the court’s decision in Ibanez to rule in favor 
of the defaulting homeowners because the foreclosing party “failed to establish it had been assigned the 
mortgages at issue prior to issuing the foreclosure notice and conducting the foreclosure sale”); Nestor 
M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 389, 403 (2013) 
(noting that a “new formalism” has emerged in recent court decisions). 
203 See Dana, supra note 22, at 505–07 (explaining and arguing against the opinion that “there is 
no good reason to insist on adherence to . . . procedural requirements for effecting a valid foreclosure as 
long as the economic substance behind the foreclosure is what it should be”). 
204 See id. at 515–16 (describing two cases in which the courts were “essentially uninterested in 
the standing” of the foreclosing banks). 
205 See id. at 514–15 (describing the “lack of documentation for previous alleged assignments of 
the mortgages in the alleged chains of title” as a factor in the Ibanez court’s holding (citing Ibanez, 941 
N.E.2d at 52)). 
206 Levitin, supra note 196, at 568–70. 
207 See Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 344–45 (noting that in contrast to judicial foreclosure 
systems, nonjudicial systems “tend to impose fewer duties on the part of the lender and place the 
burden on the borrower to . . . challenge the foreclosure process”). 
208 See Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 343–44 (“To stop a foreclosure sale in a nonjudicial 
state, the homeowner must file an affirmative court action.”).  
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increase the costs of nonjudicial foreclosure,
209 it is justified because banks 
that cannot prove ownership of the mortgage by convincing evidence have 
no right to make a family homeless.
210 
While some banks refuse to negotiate with homeowners to modify the 
terms of existing loans, others may have an incentive not to foreclose on 
underwater properties, hanging onto them until property values rise again.  
Foreclosure is costly and banks typically lose a large percentage of the 
value of the loan in the process.
211  Banks may delay foreclosure to avoid 
recording a loss of value on their books.  But because such homeowners 
cannot refinance their mortgages (because the property is worth less than 
the outstanding loan), they cannot sell or move.  This drag on the real 
estate market also inhibits the movement of labor among states; this may 
not only further depress property values and prevent the housing recovery, 
but may also have a broader dampening effect on the whole economy.  
Underwater mortgages thus pose a systemic problem for the larger 
economy as well as inhibiting individual autonomy.
212 
A potential solution to this problem is to alter the current law regarding 
mortgages in bankruptcy.  As is, first mortgages on family homes are 
among the few debts that cannot be modified through bankruptcy.
213  
Senator Durbin introduced a bill, called the “cramdown” provision, that 
would have allowed bankruptcy courts to reduce the principal debt to the 
current fair market value of the property—a proposal for underwater 
properties that might, in some cases, make loan payments affordable and 
allow the family to stay in its home.
214  The provision was controversial 
                                                                                                                          
209 See Levitin, supra note 196, at 600 (noting that mortgage credit may be more available in 
states that allow nonjudicial foreclosure (citing Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State 
Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177, 180 (2006))). 
210  See  Dana,  supra  note 22, at 507–09 (explaining why “formalities” serve the substantive 
purpose of protecting stable access to one’s home). 
211 See Levitin, supra note 196, at 603–06 (“Foreclosure is widely recognized as an expensive 
process.  Lenders incur legal costs in foreclosures, do not receive interest on defaulted properties (time-
value loss), and often are forced to sell the property at a significant loss.”). 
212  Cf.  Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social 
Management of the Housing Crisis,  45 WAKE  FOREST  L.  REV.  971,  972  (2010)  (“Underwater 
homeowners . . . would be better off if they walked away from their mortgages.”). 
213 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2) (2012); Levitin, supra note 196, at 570–71. 
214 155 CONG. REC. S4980 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009); see Levitin, supra note 196, at 580 (“Strip-
down is thus the most significant type or modification because it affects the treatment of the principal 
amount of the creditor’s claim, not just the interest.”).  For the potential benefits of principal reduction, 
see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MODIFYING MORTGAGES INVOLVING FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: 
OPTIONS FOR PRINCIPAL FORGIVENESS (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbof
iles/attachments/44115_PrincipalForgiveness.pdf; Press Release, Cong. Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, New CBO Report Concludes that Principal Reduction Programs Benefit U.S. 
Taxpayers, Homeowners, and the Economy (May 1, 2013), available at http://democrats.oversight.hou
se.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5911:new-cbo-report-concludes-that-
principal-reduction-programs-benefit-us-taxpayers-homeowners-and-the-economy&catid=3:press-
releases&Itemid=49.  
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because it would reduce the willingness of banks to give mortgages by 
making their repayment and mortgage rights contingent on the overall 
movement of housing values.  However, it is hard to see how this argument 
differs from arguments about bankruptcy generally.
215  Credit is provided 
even though creditors know debts can be discharged in bankruptcy.   
Lenders provide such credit because they only loan to people they think 
can pay the loans back—a principle that has already been adopted in 
federal law and that should have been a bedrock principle for mortgage 
lenders in the first place.  Cramdown is also unlikely to have a significant 
effect either on interest rates or willingness to grant mortgages.
216  And 
even if it translates into a small increase in interest rates charged for 
mortgages, the benefits to homeowners and to society outweigh the cost.
217  
That, after all, is the argument for mortgage and foreclosure regulation in 
the first place.  We could reduce the cost of mortgages by reintroducing 
strict foreclosure, but no one wants to do that precisely because we have a 
strong policy to protect homeowners from losing their homes unless all 
else fails. 
Cramdown is also effectively the law in states like California that 
prohibit deficiency judgments; in such states, the only recourse for banks is 
foreclosure and if the market value of the property goes down, that is all 
the lender can get out of the debtor.
218  Deficiency judgments are rare even 
in states that allow them because borrowers generally do not have other 
assets to repay the loan.  It is therefore not clear whether cramdown in 
bankruptcy would be different from current economic realities from the 
banks’ perspective.
219  But cramdown might make a huge difference to 
homeowners who might get to stay in their homes.  It might, in other 
words, change the identity of who occupies the home—an irrelevant fact to 
the bank but far from irrelevant to the homeowner. 
Because the cramdown provision went nowhere in Congress, another 
                                                                                                                          
215 Joshua Goodman & Adam Levitin, Bankruptcy Law and the Cost of Credit: The Impact of 
Cramdown on Mortgage Interest Rates 4 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP12-037, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128841; Alex Ulam, Why a Mortgage Cramdown Bill Is 
Still the Best Bet to Save the Economy,  NATION  (Oct. 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.thenation.com/print/article/164096/why-mortgage-cramdown-bill-still-best-bet-save-
economy#axzz2eQJfqQ2Z. 
216 Levitin, supra note 196, at 573 & n.26. 
217  Id.  at 599; see also Salsich,  supra  note 3, at 58–59 (discussing “loss mitigation” for 
mortgages).  But see White, supra note 212, at 1018–20 (arguing that, instead of cramdown, underwater 
mortgagors should be encouraged to “walk away” from their mortgages and lenders disabled from 
using that to affect their credit scores). 
218 See Philip G. Nichols, Opinions from California Counsel: Matters of Interest for Out-of-State 
Lenders, 118 BANKING L.J. 720, 720 (discussing restrictions on deficiency judgments in California). 
219 But see Levitin, supra note 196, at 600 (noting higher interests rates in some states that do not 
allow deficiency judgments (citing Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage 
Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143, 146 (1982))).  
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way out of this problem is for municipalities to take underwater mortgages 
by  eminent domain and transfer them at their (depressed) current fair 
market value to a new lender who will offer a new loan to the homeowner 
at the current value, making repayment more likely to be affordable to the 
borrower.
220  In effect, such eminent domain procedures would force a 
renegotiation that could or should have happened anyway but that is not 
happening either because the banks do not want to write down losses at 
this point (undermining their capital position) or because of a collective 
action problem whereby all banks are waiting for property values to rise, 
which may be part of what is stopping those values from rising.
221  Of 
course, this may result in losses on the banks’ books and a decrease in the 
number of loans they could be giving out, further dampening economic 
growth.  In some ways, this is a chicken and egg problem that can only be 
solved by looking at the magnitude of the different problems and the 
relative economic effects of bank write-downs versus persistent underwater 
mortgages. 
C.  Protecting the Legal Infrastructure of Property 
1.  By Title Formalities and Clear Public Records 
Our property system cannot work unless we have clear, public records 
of title to property.  That includes written records of all encumbrances on 
the land, such as easements, covenants, liens, mortgages, and court 
judgments.  People cannot use or develop their property if ownership is 
unclear.  Their property cannot be marketed if it is unclear whether the 
property is subject to an outstanding mortgage and who the identity of the 
mortgagee is.  There are many desirable exceptions to this principle, but 
they are exceptions.
222  Those exceptions apply in fairly well-defined 
circumstances and are designed to protect legitimate expectations.  With 
                                                                                                                          
220 Robert Hockett, Breaking the Mortgage Debt Impasse: Municipal Condemnation               
Proceedings  and  Public/Private  Partnerships  for  Mortgage  Loan  Modification,                                                          
Value Preservation, and Local Economic Recovery 29–30,  available                                                           
at  http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/upload/Memorandum-of-Law-and-Finance-21-April-
Municipal-Plan.pdf; Hockett, supra note 122, at 4–5. 
221 See, e,g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Jonathan Hacker & Matthew Close to the Sec. 
Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, San Bernadino Eminent Domain Proposal  (July 
16, 2012), available at http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/issues/capital_markets/securitization/emine
nt_domain/memorandumfromo’melvenymyerstosifmaresanbernardinoeminentdomainproposal071612.
pdf (criticizing the proposal on legal grounds).  None of these criticisms are definitive, and they rest on 
faulty assumptions about the nature of the rights in question.  Space limitations prevent a full analysis 
of the legal pros and cons of the eminent domain strategy.  Suffice it to say that states have traditionally 
regulated local property rights, that we have a long tradition of regulating mortgages to protect the 
homeowner’s equity, and that the public interest is furthered by overcoming collective action problems 
that prevent the housing market from working to serve the interests of homeowners and the public 
alike. 
222 Singer, Rule of Reason in Property Law, supra note 145, at 1395.  
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regard to mortgages, knowing who owns property and what mortgages 
validly attach to it not only makes property alienable but also protects 
consumer interests in avoiding double payment or liability and knowing 
with whom to negotiate in the event of default.
223 
The banks tried to save money by creating a national, electronic 
registry for mortgages.  In so doing, they tried to obtain the benefits of a 
unified national system while (feebly) attempting to comply with the 
regulatory statutes of the more than fifty jurisdictions that regulate real 
property in the United States.  Their efforts highlight the necessary tension 
between local and national regulation of the economy and of real property.  
On one hand, property owners might benefit from uniform national 
standards and they might save money by enacting a national registration 
system for real property titles.  On the other hand, property has 
traditionally been governed by state law, and there are significant 
variations in how the states regulate both mortgages and foreclosures.   
Having a national takeover of mortgage law would deprive the states of the 
ability to protect their citizens in the manner they deem best.  For example, 
some states like California ban deficiency judgments; California is willing 
to live with the higher costs of mortgages that this may entail.
224  Other 
states allow such recoveries.
225  Some states require judicial foreclosure; 
others are more interested in the potentially lower costs of nonjudicial 
foreclosure procedures.
226 
Clearly this is not a topic with an easy resolution.  We could stay with 
the current system that grants states the power to regulate negotiable 
instruments, mortgages, and foreclosures while complying with certain 
                                                                                                                          
223 White, supra note 22, at 494–96; Robinson, supra note 21, at 1635–36. 
224 But see Bar-Gill, supra note 183, at 1113 (arguing that deficiency actions often cost more than 
they would achieve, giving little protection to lenders and that therefore, in theory, they should not 
affect the interest rate charged to borrowers); Nelson & Whitman, supra note 111, at 1429 (“[I]n 
practice, deficiency judgments are rare . . . .”). 
225  See  NAT’L C ONSUMER L AW C TR., FORECLOSURE  REPORT:  SURVEY  OF                                       
STATE  FORECLOSURE  LAWS  1–2,  20–21,  available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws/survey-foreclosure-card.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2013) (analyzing state foreclosure laws and indicating, for example, that Alabama and 
Delaware impose no limitations on deficiency judgments); see also JOHN  RAO  &  GEOFF  WALSH, 
NAT’L C ONSUMER L AW C TR., FORECLOSING A DREAM:  STATE  LAWS                                                         
DEPRIVE  HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC  PROTECTIONS  3 (2009), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf  (”In 36 
states and the District of Columbia, mortgage holders can pursue so-called ‘deficiency judgment’ 
claims against homeowners even after the foreclosed home has been sold at auction.”). 
226 See Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 343–49 (explaining the difference between judicial and 
nonjudicial foreclosure); Dana, supra note 22, at 511–12 (“[J]udicial foreclosure is widely perceived to 
be slower and more expensive [than nonjudicial foreclosure] for foreclosing entities.”); Elizabeth 
Renuart, Toward a More Equitable Balance: Homeowner and Purchaser Tensions in Non-Judicial 
Foreclosure States, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 562, 564–67 (2012) (explaining potential flaws in the 
nonjudicial foreclosure process); White, supra note 22, at 489–93 (explaining the important procedural 
and substantive differences between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure).  
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federal statutes that impose minimum standards on mortgage markets and 
securities markets.  We could seek greater uniformity among states by 
drafting uniform mortgage laws that actually get passed by state 
legislatures.
227  Or we could seek greater national unity by federal 
legislation that either sets minimum standards for state law or by drastic 
and unprecedented legislation that preempts the field and makes real 
property law a national, rather than a local, enterprise.
228 
It is hard to identify clear value valences that emerge from the choice 
between federal and state regulation.  It seems that people often push for 
one or the other based not on the superior competence of that level of 
government but on their views of whether it is more or less likely to 
regulate in the way they favor.  Libertarians who generally prefer “state’s 
rights” sometimes argue for federal preemption if they believe Congress 
will pass laws that increase “market freedoms” and toss away state 
regulations thought to be oppressive.
229  Liberals who generally prefer 
federal preemption change their mind when they see that states often pass 
more protective consumer protection laws than those enacted by Congress 
and the President.
230 
The choice is really between uniformity and diversity.  And we cannot 
make this choice wholly separate from our views about the substance of 
proposed regulations.  Uniform federal regulation may reduce costs for 
businesses and homeowners because banks would not have to comply with 
the varying legal standards of many jurisdictions.  On the other hand, if the 
United States enacts a regulatory law that prohibits practices that banks 
want to engage in, they may find that they prefer local regulation that 
allows them freedom to engage in market practices they favor in the states 
that allow them.  Conversely, consumers may favor either state or federal 
regulation depending on which gives them the freedoms they want and the 
protections they seek. 
                                                                                                                          
227 Compare Helen Mason, No One Saw It Coming—Again: Systemic Risk and State Foreclosure 
Proceedings: Why a National Uniform Foreclosure Law Is Necessary, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 41, 44 
(2012) (arguing for a federal foreclosure statute that preempts state law), with Nelson & Whitman, 
supra note 111, at 1509–13 (arguing for adoption of a uniform nonjudicial foreclosure law). 
228  See Nelson & Whitman, supra  note 111, at 1509–13 (arguing for federal foreclosure 
legislation); Woolley & Herzog, supra note 85, at 368 (“[Because] there are no federal laws governing 
private property rights . . . . a federal system of title (electronic or otherwise) is not feasible . . . .”); id. 
at 397 (“The MERS system is an example of a flawed national system that did not take into account the 
fact that each state determines its own real property laws and recording system.”). 
229 See Linda S. Mullenix, Strange Bedfellows: The Politics of Preemption, 59 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 837, 864 (2009) (discussing how conservative pro-business and libertarian interests align to 
defend federal preemption to prevent “the harmful influence of local justice”). 
230 See Marin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 
(2001) (stating that liberals, historically, favor a broad doctrine of federal preemption but prefer the 
conservative, narrow doctrine when states attempt to limit tort liability producing a greater federal 
foreclosure of state tort claims).  
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Tradition suggests that property law will continue to be local, meaning 
that banks must do business in a manner that complies with the property 
law regimes of the various states.  It is not impossible to do this.  There is 
no dispute that if you want to build a house in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
you have to comply with the state housing code and local zoning law and 
building regulations.  It should not be surprising to banks that the rules 
governing mortgage transactions are also local in nature.  The bottom line 
is that states generally want formalized property transactions; they also 
provide a public recording system for those who want to protect their 
property rights from other claims.
231  The banks would be wise to figure 
out what those regulations are and how to comply with them.  Neither of 
these obligations is onerous.  When mortgages are assigned, the banks will 
want a record of the assignment.  Pure carelessness led to mistakes in 
keeping track of mortgage assignments.
232  Banks deal in numbers all the 
time; they are supposed to not make mistakes.  It is not unreasonable to 
expect them to keep clear records of mortgage transactions. 
The bottom line is that property titles must be sufficiently clear and 
public.  There are various ways to achieve these goals.  To some extent, the 
clarity issue is likely to be improved in the future by the banks exercising 
greater care in documenting mortgage transactions.  They have 
experienced first hand the problems that ensue when they cannot prove 
they have a right to foreclose on property.  Not only does this affect their 
ability to enforce their rights but it has the potential to affect the banks’ 
capital requirements and poses a risk to the banks’ solvency.
233  So, as with 
qualification, it may be the case that no law reforms will be necessary, at 
least in the short term, to induce banks to go back to careful creation of 
written records for mortgage assignments.  At the same time, states should 
consider adopting the Michigan approach to nonjudicial foreclosures by 
requiring proof of the “record chain of title  .  .  .  prior to the date of 
sale . . . evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the party foreclosing 
the mortgage.”
234  State laws may also need to be updated not only to make 
electronic records more easily available but also to ensure their 
authenticity. 
                                                                                                                          
231 SINGER, supra note 4, § 12.3.3.1, at 876–77. 
232 See Woolley & Herzog, supra note 85, at 388–89 (discussing how a property’s chain of title 
can be lost in public records or “severely diluted” as a result of MERS). 
233 See Renuart, supra note 226, at 563 (“[T]he foreclosing parties frequently do not possess the 
right to foreclose and the resulting sales may be unlawful.”); see also Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street 
Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 8 (2009) (“Th[e] 
financial crisis, marked by a plethora of home foreclosures and illiquid mortgage-related assets which 
have created a capital hole on the balance sheets of banks and financial institutions, has spilled over 
into the greater economy . . . .”). 
234 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3204(3) (2012); see Froehle, supra note 91, at 1740 (recommending 
adoption of Michigan’s requirement by other states).  
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Given the existence of MERS, one law reform is definitely needed to 
ensure the publicity of land titles.  If we are not going to abolish MERS or 
replace it with a national public registration system, MERS should at least 
be required to make its records public.
235  The state recording systems were 
created to build incentives to induce buyers and lenders to record deeds 
and mortgages in a public office.  This lets any potential buyer determine 
who owns the property and what encumbrances or restrictions are attached 
to it.  The MERS system privatizes this information.  Because the banks 
were so careless with their records of mortgage assignments and their 
custody of notes, and because there is evidence that MERS records are 
often inaccurate,
236 there is no reason to trust the MERS records.  The only 
way to regain trust is to induce banks to be more careful about mortgage 
assignments and rights in the notes and to make the chain of title accessible 
to potential buyers.  As Alan White argues, “[A] better system design 
would incorporate transparent and authoritative registration of mortgage 
loan ownership throughout the life of the loan, and not just at the point 
foreclosure is initiated.”
237  Property will not be alienable if buyers cannot 
trust that they will actually own the property they think they are buying.  If 
that property is possibly subject to outstanding liens of which they are 
unaware, they will be discouraged from buying the land.  If MERS is going 
to be our repository of information about mortgage transactions, there is no 
way to achieve these goals without forcing MERS records to become both 
complete and accessible to the public. 
The traditional recording system worked by giving banks an incentive 
to record their mortgages.  The MERS system arguably weakened that 
incentive by giving banks the impression that it was not necessary to notify 
MERS whenever mortgages were assigned.  Because the courts have not 
fully accepted the MERS system,
238 we have a renewed incentive for banks 
to notify MERS about mortgage transfers.  That means that MERS must 
track not only the current mortgage holder, but also the history of 
                                                                                                                          
235 See Laura A. Steven, MERS and the Mortgage Crisis: Obfuscating Loan Ownership and the 
Need for Clarity, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 251, 270 (2012) (arguing for federal legislation 
requiring MERS to “open its records to the public”); White, supra note 22, at 497 (advocating full 
disclosure of agency relationships and transfer history); Zacks, supra note 77, at 607–08 (arguing for 
greater public transparency in MERS records, including revealing the identity of investors, disclosing 
when transfers are made, and allowing recording by lenders on the MERS database).  Note that the 
Truth in Lending Act was amended to require homeowners to be notified of changes in beneficial 
ownership of loans.  See id. at 593–94 (citing Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-22, § 404, 123 Stat. 1632, 1658 (2009)). 
236 See Woolley & Herzog, supra note 85, at 365 (stating that courts have found the MERS model 
“wholly inaccurate”). 
237 White, supra note 22, at 497.  
238 See Steven, supra note 235, at 251 (“[S]tate courts are far from reaching a consensus as to 
whether MERS, a company that tracks mortgage ownership but has no actual interest in the mortgages 
themselves, even has the power to initiate a foreclosure.” (citing Peterson, supra note 25, at 1378)).  
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assignments from which that entity derives its rights.  Traditionally, those 
assignments would be accomplished both by endorsement of the note and a 
mortgage assignment.  Banks must figure out how to comply with these 
requirements or seek law reforms that might simplify them.  If some states 
will continue to allow the current mortgagee to foreclose simply by 
showing an assignment of the mortgage from MERS, we need to establish 
a requirement that banks register mortgages for them to be valid, either by 
recording them in public recording offices or by notifying MERS of the 
transfer.  The subprime crisis shows that we need clear, public records of 
both the original mortgage and subsequent assignments.  If MERS cannot 
be reformed to accomplish these goals, then a federal public agency should 
be created to take its place.  Such an agency could insist on appropriate 
regulation of mortgage transfers while preserving the accessible, public 
notice of mortgage liens. 
Changes are definitely needed to the U.C.C. and state foreclosure 
statutes to clarify the relationship between negotiable instruments law and 
mortgage law.  Because it may be useful for one party to hold the note and 
another to hold the mortgage, we need clearer answers to the question of 
which party is the principal and which is the agent.  We also need 
clarification of how mortgage transfers should occur.  Traditionally, 
whoever has the right to enforce the note has the right to foreclose to 
enforce the note, but state law has been less than clear about how mortgage 
assignments should happen.  Banks could have avoided problems by 
formally endorsing notes, keeping them, and producing and recording 
mortgage assignments.  They failed to ensure adequate formality to these 
transactions; that is what we need to restore.  In some sense, it does not 
matter how we do so, just that the laws help make this possible and 
facilitate it.  If the states agree on the underlying principles and procedures, 
then state law could be made uniform (by common law or a uniform act) to 
effectuate the shared norms.  In general, courts assume the mortgage serves 
the interests of the note holder; the mortgage is security for the loan.
239  
They differ on whether the transfer of the mortgage brings the note with it 
or whether the mortgage holder holds it for the benefit of the note 
holder.
240  They also differ on what acts are sufficient to prove who is an 
                                                                                                                          
239 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 (1996) (discussing the three theories 
of mortgage law traditionally recognized by American courts); SINGER,  supra  note 4, at 894 
(explaining that borrowing money from a bank to finance real property entails obtaining a note and a 
mortgage to secure repayment of the note); Renuart, supra  note 226, at 565 (“In most states, a 
mortgage creates a security interest in the borrower’s real property and permits the mortgagee to 
foreclose in the event of non-payment or a breach of the note or duties listed in the security agreement.” 
(citing RICHARD R. POWELL, 1 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.03 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2013))). 
240 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4 & cmt. a & illus. 4 (proposing 
an approach that permits the parties to separate a note from a deed of trust), with Carpenter v. Longan, 
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agent for another principal.
241  The courts are wrestling with these issues 
now and they are among the issues that were not completely clear before 
the subprime crisis.  Both clarity and uniformity would be desirable in this 
area.  
Various approaches could achieve these goals.  Back in 2002, Dale 
Whitman argued for a uniform electronic recording act.
242  He has recently 
recommended a federally created national mortgage registry to correct the 
deficiencies in the MERS system.
243  Adam Levitin has argued for a 
national registry of mortgage notes,
244 while Alan White has argued that 
we should merge the note and the mortgage into a single document that 
could be more easily tracked.
245  Dustin Zacks has suggested that MERS 
should be “forc[ed] to store actual electronic documents that were 
previously recorded at the local recording level, such as mortgages and 
assignments.”
246  And Tanya Marsh has argued for nationalizing the title 
registration system, effectively replacing both state recording offices and 
MERS with a public federal system of title and mortgage registration.
247  
Rather than choose among these proposals, I simply want to applaud them 
for suggesting ways to achieve the ultimate goal: to restore our system of 
clear, public titles that the banks have destroyed. 
How should courts handle foreclosures still in the pipeline?  What 
should they do when the chain of title is broken, the note lost, the statute of 
frauds violated, and no clear written evidence that the foreclosing bank has 
a right to foreclose?  In some cases, no law reform is needed.  After all, the 
homeowner has an interest in clearing title.  If the bank cannot foreclose, 
this does not free the homeowner from the recorded mortgage in MERS’s 
name.  Potential buyers may be discouraged from buying if they cannot 
identify which bank holds the mortgage.  That means that homeowners 
have an interest in negotiating with the bank to clear the title.  The bank, of 
course, has an interest either in renegotiating the mortgage or in 
foreclosing, arranging a short sale, or engaging in some other way to obtain 
value out of the mortgage it purchased.  In the absence of transaction costs, 
a deal could be struck between the bank and the homeowner.  But of 
course, there are transaction costs and many banks have refused to 
                                                                                                                          
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 274 (1873) (elucidating the traditional rule that “[t]he note and mortgage are 
inseparable”). 
241 See, e.g., Dale A. Whitman, Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as a Paradigm, 1998 BYU 
L. REV. 1169, 1179 (discussing several methods for establishing agent authority).  
242 Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet?  The Case for a Uniform Electronic Recording Act, 24 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245 (2002). 
243 Whitman, supra note 68, at 46. 
244 Levitin, supra note 112, at 53. 
245 White, supra note 22, at 498.  
246 Zacks, supra note 77, at 554. 
247 Marsh, supra note 150, at 24–26.  David Waks has similarly advocated for the creation of an 
independent federal agency to fulfill this role.  Waks, supra note 79, at 32.   
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negotiate with homeowners.  That is why many states have passed laws 
that prohibit foreclosure unless the parties can show they engaged in good 
faith negotiations, usually through mediation.
248  Mediation is easier to 
implement in judicial foreclosure states than in the majority of states that 
allow nonjudicial foreclosure.
249  At the same time, a few nonjudicial 
foreclosure states have experimented with programs to promote 
mediation.
250 
From the standpoint of potential buyers, the answer may be to 
purchase title insurance.  There have been few disputes among banks as to 
which banks “own” the mortgage.  The problem has been that banks could 
not show that they complied with the statute of frauds.
251  The risk of 
another bank coming in to sweep the title away appears to be low if the 
parties contract out of the problem.  Title insurance companies may be 
willing to provide insurance because banks and consumers want it and 
because this might restore the alienability of the property.  The risks of title 
problems may be relatively low in such cases because banks are not likely 
to claim rights in mortgages they already sold; if they do, other banks 
could make such claims on them.  At the same time, the willingness to sell 
title insurance may depend on the legal vulnerability insurers face—which 
is not completely known, given the ongoing litigation about the effects of 
MERS on property titles.
252  There is some evidence that title insurance 
companies are not willing to insure clouded subprime titles.
253  Even if 
                                                                                                                          
248 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244 § 35B(b) (West 2012) (requiring creditors to make 
good faith efforts to avoid foreclosure); see also Foreclosure Fairness Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 61.24.163 (West 2013) (explaining that, prior to initiating foreclosure, lenders must tell homeowners 
about the availability of state-led mediation services); Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 
1286 (Nev. 2011) (finding that a bank cannot foreclose if it fails to act in good faith to participate in 
state-mandated mediation with the borrower as required by state law (citing NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§  107.086 (LexisNexis 2013)));  ALAN  WHITE, UNIFORM  LAW  COMM’N, STATE  FORECLOSURE 
MEDIATION LAWS: EXAMPLES AND RESEARCH FOR A UNIFORM STATUTE (May 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage%20foreclosure/4_2012may11_RREMFFP_State%
20Foreclosure%20Mediation%20Laws%20memo_White.pdf (discussing the adoption of statewide 
foreclosure mediation programs throughout the United States); Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 
364–70 (discussing various state mediation programs and identifying considerations for those states 
contemplating enacting their own programs); Salsich, supra  note 3, at 59–64 (providing statistics 
regarding statewide sponsorship of foreclosure mediation programs).  
249 Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 346–47. 
250 See id. at 367–69 (analyzing the programs in California and Nevada); id. at 355 (noting that 
the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) implemented a procedure for evaluating 
borrower claims for loan modifications and that the state laws piggy-backed on those standards). 
251 See In re Coulliard, 486 B.R. 481, 486 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2012) (“[T]he recording statutes 
indicate that any conveyance which is not ‘recorded as provided by law’ is void against a subsequent 
purchaser.  As the bank acknowledges . . . the statutory definition of a ‘conveyance’ presupposes 
compliance with the statute of frauds.” (citation omitted)). 
252 Woolley & Herzog, supra note 85, at 394–96 (stating that title insurance may not be available 
for properties with clouded titles). 
253 Id. at 395–96.  
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such insurance is available, it will increase the cost of buying and 
financing real property.  
To clear title and make it marketable, the courts may need to accept 
affidavits from banks that show why they reasonably believe that they are 
entitled to foreclose on the property.  The banks cannot be allowed to 
“robo-sign” affidavits without any investigation or presentation of 
evidence that backs up their claim of ownership of the mortgage.  But if 
the bank can produce reliable evidence of their ownership of the mortgage, 
then it is not unfair to hold borrowers to the contracts they made, unless the 
borrower can show that the entire agreement violated the consumer 
protection statute because it was based on unfair or deceptive practices.  In 
such a case, it would be appropriate for courts to promote renegotiation of 
the loan terms to approximate the terms the parties would have agreed to if 
they had not been unfair.  It would also be appropriate to require banks to 
show, by cost-benefit analysis, that foreclosure is superior to loan 
modification for borrowers who can afford to continue to make modified 
payments. 
2.  By Mitigating Systemic Risk 
Despite the subprime crisis, it is important to remember that 
securitization is a good thing.  Done correctly, it can spread risk, lower the 
costs of housing finance, and widen access to housing ownership.
254  In 
general, it is desirable to allow property rights to be disaggregated and 
repackaged to suit human purposes.  However, this “freedom of contract” 
principle works only if it is kept within regulatory boundaries that preserve 
the infrastructure of the property and market system.  That legal 
infrastructure ensures that transactions are mutually beneficial, rather than 
vehicles for committing fraud, and manages transactions to mitigate 
systemic risk. 
Just as we have consumer protection in place for mortgage borrowers, 
we have securities regulations to protect investors in mortgage-backed 
securities.  But existing protections were either insufficient or 
insufficiently appreciated by securitizers.  Banks misled investors about the 
characteristics of the bonds they were marketing.
255  Litigation is 
proceeding now against various banks for their marketing practices.
256  In 
addition, the rating system for mortgages is broken.  The rating agencies 
turned out to work for the banks marketing the mortgages instead of acting 
                                                                                                                          
254 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1315, 1324 
(2009) (recognizing that when securitization is properly utilized it is an efficient tool to allocate risk 
with capital and allows companies to access capital markets differently). 
255 Silver-Greenberg, Banks Face Wave of New Mortgage-Securities Suits, supra note 181. 
256 Isidore, supra note 181; Silver-Greenberg, Banks Face Wave of New Mortgage-Securities 
Suits, supra note 181.  
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as professionals expressing objective opinions that investors could trust.
257  
The conflict of interest between rating agencies and investors means that 
the ratings no longer fulfill the function they were intended to play. 
These problems could be fixed in a number of ways.  One solution is 
better disclosure.  The banks should not mislead investors about the quality 
of the mortgages contained in mortgage-backed securities.  And it should 
be clear what ratings issued by rating agencies mean.  If a AAA rating 
means that the mortgages in the securitized package are what the seller 
says they are, rather than merely describing it as a relatively safe 
investment, then that should be crystal clear to investors.  If a AAA rating 
does not mean that the investment is safe, the rating agencies should 
explain that in no uncertain terms. 
An alternative solution is to recreate the goodwill the rating agencies 
squandered, either by changing the way they are compensated or by 
replacing them with public agencies whose mission is to protect investors 
and other consumers of mortgage-backed securities.
258  The current system 
puts the rating agencies in the pocket of the securitizing banks and gives 
them incentives to mislead investors.  It would be better if incentives could 
be changed to put the rating agencies on the side of the investors rather 
than the sellers of securities.  And if that is not possible, then they should 
be replaced by a professional, expert public agency. 
While securitization should be promoted, it must be better regulated to 
protect all of us from the systemic risks associated with subprime 
mortgages.  Even if investors are willing to take great risks, they are not 
entitled to impose those risks on the rest of us.  And the biggest risk they 
are not entitled to impose on society is the risk of undermining the 
foundations of the property system itself.  Regulations designed to clarify 
ownership are preconditions to markets.  They are the way we ensure that 
we have both freedom and prosperity.  Fair treatment of consumers and 
adequate formalization and publicity of titles are the bedrock on which 
housing exchange and finance sit.  These foundational protections make 
property markets possible and securitization exists on top of that 
foundation, not despite it. 
Finally, there are many ways to promote homeownership for low and 
                                                                                                                          
257 See Katy Burne, Lawmakers Tell Raters to “Get It Right,” WALL ST. J., June 22, 2013, at B2 
(“We don’t want history to repeat itself, and the history is that the rating agencies aided and abetted the 
big banks in giving sweetheart ratings to structured-finance deals.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
258 The Dodd-Frank law requires the SEC to examine conflicts of interest in the bond rating 
agency and either create a board that would assign a rating agency to rate structured-finance deals or 
create an alternative mechanism to avoid the conflict of interest that arises when issuers pay for the 
ratings.  See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 919a, 124 Stat. 1837, 1837–38 (2010) (requiring the SEC to 
consider conflicts of interests so to protect investors).  As of May 2013, no reforms have been put into 
place.  Jeannette Neumann, Rating Firms Steer Clear of an Overhaul, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2013, at 
C1.   
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moderate income families that work.
259  The subprime market was not one 
of them.  To the extent that the idea of spreading homeownership was a 
justification for subprime mortgages, we should learn from experience and 
move back to other strategies to achieve this purpose.  Many nonprofit 
organizations provide affordable housing ownership in a manner that led to 
few defaults.
260  Low income housing ownership was not the problem; 
subprime mortgages were.  And we should realize that many people are 
better off renting than owning.
261  That, in turn, requires better enforcement 
of landlord-tenant law, especially promoting housing code enforcement 
and preventing invidious discrimination. 
IV.  PROPERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The subprime crisis happened because banks sold mortgages to people 
who should not have bought them.  Some of those people took honest risks 
but others had to be convinced that the deals were in their best interest.  
Some banks convinced them through unfair and deceptive consumer 
practices.  Then they sold these risky mortgages to investors on the 
pretense that they were as safe as U.S. Treasury bonds.  In addition, the 
banks tried to evade regulatory requirements they considered costly and 
archaic while assuming that the courts would trust them to manage housing 
finance as they saw fit.  But nothing turned out as the banks imagined it 
would.  Borrowers defaulted, the housing bubble burst, borrowers could 
neither refinance nor sell, and banks had trouble foreclosing when they 
could not prove they had a right to do so, making titles unmarketable.  Not 
only did banks treat many homeowners unfairly and deceptively, but they 
similarly misled investors in mortgage-backed securities and created a 
market designed to fail, causing a worldwide recession.  Worse still—and 
almost hard to believe—they broke a well-functioning recording system 
that had, for more than three hundred years, provided a basis for clear 
public property titles in the United States. 
The banks’ failures cannot be corrected by a simple admonition to 
                                                                                                                          
259  See D AVID  ABROMOWITZ  &  JANNEKE  RATCLIFFE, CTR. FOR AM.  PROGRESS, 
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adhere to the traditional rules.  Keep records of your transaction and use 
available public recording and registration procedures to document those 
transactions publicly.  We had clear rules but the banks did not follow 
them.  What we need is a greater appreciation of the benefits of having a 
secure legal infrastructure for property as well as a moral compass that 
bends away from unfair and deceptive practices.  New rules that clarify 
bankers’ obligations can help, but they will not suffice.  To prevent unfair 
and deceptive practices that harm consumers and investors, we should 
define safe harbors through regulations that create presumptively valid 
loans.  Federal law now does this, but we should also retain the statutes 
that supplement safe harbors with prohibitions of “unfair and deceptive” 
practices.  No set of clear rules could be complete enough to catch all the 
ways businesses can trick consumers and investors into products they 
should not be buying. 
Federal and state law has long prohibited unfair and deceptive 
practices in consumer transactions.  These laws represent a modern version 
of the Biblical injunction not to “put a stumbling block before the blind.”
262  
Both ancient and modern law prohibit market transactions whose purpose 
or effect is to lead someone to disaster.  Deceptive practices fueled the 
subprime market and consumers were induced to take out loans they could 
not afford.  Banks should not sell mortgages to those who cannot pay them 
back.  These loans not only impose undue externalities on others but harm 
the consumers they are intended to benefit.  It is surprising that we appear 
to need the new federal law that prohibits selling a mortgage to someone 
who cannot afford to pay it back.  But such a law was necessary because 
banks made risky loans and then fooled investors into thinking they were 
AAA safe. 
We also need to recreate clear, public property titles either by replacing 
MERS with a national mortgage registration system or by requiring MERS 
to open its records to the public and forcing banks to register all mortgage 
assignments with MERS so we have clear chain-of-title records of who has 
the right to enforce the loan secured by the mortgage.  To address hard 
foreclosure cases still in the pipeline, courts cannot strictly enforce the 
statute of frauds in the face of such massive resistance to it without 
harming both homeowners and the general public.  We must acknowledge 
that even bankers make mistakes.  Property law has always been 
sufficiently flexible to settle conflicting claims when we have excusable 
errors.  I have proposed ways to clear property title that require banks to 
prove their right to foreclose by clear evidence while protecting 
homeowners by promoting negotiation to mutually beneficial outcomes.  
The bottom line is that we are entitled to expect bankers to act 
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responsibly.  You cannot build a house without a foundation and you 
cannot operate a market without a legal infrastructure.  Of course bankers 
are in business to make money but we expect them to do so without 
undermining the framework that makes our housing market function.   
There are many ways to make money honorably, but deceiving consumers 
and investors is not one of them.  There are many ways to improve the 
efficiency of our property title system, but privatizing title records and 
carelessly recording them is not one of them.  There are many ways to 
improve our housing markets, but undermining their legal infrastructure is 
not one of them.  Property law must be interpreted or changed to vindicate 
these norms, and business ethics must evolve to internalize them. 